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INTRODUCTION
After a casual review of most states' statutes, a reader could
conclude that strong protection exists for the confidences re-
vealed in medical treatment, especially for those revealed in
psychotherapy.' Professionals' general duty to maintain the con-
fidentiality of their patients and clients often is supplemented
with statutory testimonial privileges intended to protect confi-
dences from invasion by courts and other governmental bodies. 2
This seems to be the age of psychotherapy and medical privi-
leges.
A more detailed reading of all the statutes, however, along
with related cases, general legal principles, and commentaries
could lead a careful reader to a somewhat different conclusion.
The protection the law has given with one hand has all too often
been taken away with the other. Privileges, and the general
obligation of confidentiality, increasingly have been subject to
exceptions and limitations, effectively reduced by inconsistent
federal and state rules, and threatened by changes in health care
"Psychotherapist" has no single meaning. Most commonly it refers to psychi-
atrists and psychologists licensed for independent practice. In other cases it refers to any
professional who provides counseling or mental health therapy, including social workers,
psychiatric nurses, and counselors, as well as psychologists and psychiatrists.
2 S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DisABLED AND THE LAW
592-604 (3d ed. 1986) (providing a state by state summary of privilege statutes); J.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2285-86, 2380-91 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961 &
Supp. 1986); Churgin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Search for Identity, in
2 LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 215 (D. Weisstub ed. 1986)
(an excellent summary of the law regarding privileges in psychotherapy including a state
by state summary of privilege statutes); Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged
Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450 (1985) [hereinafter Developments]; Comment,
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Under Federal Rule 501, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRMINOLOGY
388, 396 (1984) (listing forty-one states which statutorily provide the psychotherapist-
patient privilege).
1986-871
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
financing. Hospitals, other health care facilities, and practition-
ers are in the middle of this apparent paradox.
This Article reviews both the giving and the taking away:
the protections afforded to confidentiality by privileges and legal
duties, and the way those protections are eroded. The duties of
professionals and others to maintain confidences are noted, but
testimonial privileges are emphasized. This Article proposes re-
forms in the way we try to protect confidentiality and suggests
that the protection of therapy confidences be dealt with as a
coherent whole (privileges and obligations of confidentiality
should be dealt with together). Exceptions to privileges should
be reduced and narrowed, and federal law should recognize the
desirability of a consistent approach to confidentiality. Perhaps
most importantly, the transmission of some confidential infor-
mation to third parties should carry with it a duty which would
require the recipient to maintain confidentiality ("extended con-
fidentiality").
Kentucky law serves as the basis for this review of psychoth-
erapy and medical privileges. Although each state has unique
issues and approaches to confidentiality, the problems seen in
Kentucky are typical of those present elsewhere. Kentucky has
been a leader in adopting a variety of medical, psychotherapy,
and counseling privileges, but similar privileges have been adopted
in many other states.
3
I. REASONS FOR PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY
There are three major reasons for protecting the confidences
of medical treatment and psychotherapy. These can be broadly
labelled (1) "utilitarian," (2) "patient privacy," and (3) "profes-
sional honor" reasons. Because of the social costs in protecting
confidentiality, those promoting its protection bear some burden
of demonstrating the benefits. Making information unavailable
increases the risk of incorrect or bad decisions, tends to reduce
the efficiency of organizations and society generally, and con-
3 Like many other states, the answers to many specific questions about the
interpretation of privilege statutes and duties of confidentiality in Kentucky remain
uncertain. One is, therefore, left to the interpretations of other states in trying to
determine what Kentucky would do with a specific question.
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ceals information of significant public interest. The costs of
confidentiality also extend to many other areas, such as employ-
ment decisions (e.g. medical data about an employee may not
be available to a potential employer), marital decisions (medical
information about one partner may not be available to the
other), and political decisions (a candidate's psychiatric history
may not be available to the public). These costs of confidential-
ity, however, most commonly arise with issues of testimonial
privileges where these costs (preventing courts from having rel-
evant information) are especially apparent.
4
A. The Utilitarian Approach
The utilitarian approach theorizes that the protection of
confidentiality is justified because the benefits to society are
greater than the costs associated with confidentiality. This idea
is apparent in the well-known Wigmore criteria for justifying
privileges which provide that the injury to a socially important
relationship that will result from disclosure of a communication
must be greater than the benefit to the "correct disposal of
litigation." '
The cost/benefit analysis, employing the Wigmore criteria,
is intended to determine whether a whole class of communica-
tions (e.g. those between physicians and patients) should be
legally protected. 6 A much different analysis determines in each
I Early privileges apparently were based on the proposition that disclosure of
information from certain relationships was morally wrong and society ought not intrude
in those areas. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional
Secret, 39 Sw. L.J. 661 (1985) (calling for greater study of the history of and basis for
medical privileges). See generally J.A. BRUCE, PRIVACY AND CONFIMENTIALTY OF HEALTH
CAM INFORMATION (1984).
1 (1) the communications must originate in the confidence that they will
not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties;
(3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered; (4) the injury that would inure to the relation
by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
WIMORRE, supra note 2, at § 2285 (emphasis added). See Tabor v. Commonwealth, 625
S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1981).
Developments, supra note 2, at 1472-80 (analyzing the Wigmore criteria for
privileged communications).
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individual case whether a particular communication between a
specific patient and physician should be protected. In the former,
the issue is whether the social benefits derived from protecting
all of the covered communications, and thereby protecting cer-
tain professional relationships generally, is greater than the costs
in loss of information from denied access to all such commu-
nications. In the latter, the costs and benefits of protecting the
single communication are considered. This second analysis, how-
ever, does not include consideration of the benefits of protecting
generally a whole class of communications, such as the effects
that protecting confidentiality may have on others who may
engage in similar conversations in the future. Thus, an analysis
that looks at costs and benefits of each individual conversation
may incorrectly reveal a very high cost-benefit ratio for a specific
communication. The result may be quite different if calculated
as part of an overall process of protecting certain confidential
communications.
B. Privacy of Patients
The privacy interests of patients are further reasons for
protecting medical and psychotherapy communications. 7 The most
obvious privacy interest involved is the ability to control access
to personal information about oneself. Information from psy-
chotherapy is among the most highly personal information im-
aginable, dealing with intimate facets of a patient's life, such as
fantasies, fears, and thoughts. Medical treatment deals less fre-
quently with highly personal information.
Another privacy interest is autonomy, the ability to make
fundamental decisions for oneself without significant govern-
mental interference. Psychotherapy depends on the patient trust-
ing the therapist and being completely open in disclosing
information. Therefore, interference with the openness or trust
effectively may deny access to meaningful therapy. Confiden-
tiality has been widely assumed to be a sine qua non for suc-
Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1
(1980).
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cessful therapy, 8 and the absence of confidentiality may interfere
with a patient's decision to undertake therapy. The existence of
confidentiality generally has been considered less critical for
medical treatment, and thus. the absence of confidentiality in
this area is less of a threat to successful treatment. 9
The constitutional right of privacy has been seen by some as
providing protection for the confidences of therapy. This issue
is considered later in the Article.10
C. Professional Honor
Privileges originated to protect a professional gentleman's
honor by not requiring him to disclose what he promised to
keep secret." That rationale for confidentiality, and, in partic-
ular, testimonial privileges, has long since been abandoned as a
stated basis for the legal protection of confidences. In truth,
however, professional honor or obligation is still very much a
part of the protection of confidentiality. Professional ethics of
the medical and psychotherapy professions specifically require
that confidences be maintained within the limits of the law.1 2 In
addition, statutory privileges seldom are adopted without a sig-
nificant lobbying effort by the professionals to be covered by
the privileges. The political reality is that the criteria for adopting
privilege statutes often is whether the professionals seeking the
privilege have sufficient lobbying strength to have a statute
enacted. Thus, in practice, professional honor or ethical obli-
gation is an important basis for privileges.
The Advisory Committee for the Supreme Court's proposed rules of evidence
in its comments on the psychotherapist-patient privilege noted that "there is wide
agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment....
A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment." Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
Rule 504, Advisory Committee's Note (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, CONFIDENTIALrry AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN THE PRACCE OF
PsYcmATRY, REP. No. 45, at 92 (1960)), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973).
1 E.g., WIGaioRE, supra note 2, at §§ 2285, 2380a, at 527-28, 828-32; Chafee,
Privileged Communications, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 611 (1943); Degnan, The Law of Federal
Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REa. 275, 300 (1962). But see Black, The Marital and
Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 50-
51.
See infra notes 72-121 and accompanying text.
WIGNMORE, supra note 2, at § 2290.
,2 See infra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
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II. ON GrvING: CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGES
The confidences of medical treatment and psychotherapy are
protected in a variety of ways. The major mechanisms are ethical
obligations, licensing statutes, the potential for civil liability
based on negligence (breach of an obligation to maintain secrets)
or the right of privacy (public disclosure of private facts), and
testimonial privileges.
A. Ethical Obligations
Protecting the confidentiality of patients has been an ethical
obligation of the helping and healing professions for centuries. 3
All major medical, mental health, and counseling professional
organizations, such as physicians,' 4 psychologists, 15 psychia-
13 Hippocrates stressed the obligation of healers to refrain from repeating any
personal information they might uncover in the course of treatment. See S. FRa'=, 2
Collected Papers 356 (1959 ed.); Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement of the Ther-
apist: Technical Necessities for Absolute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 Am!. J. Psy-
CElATRY 1093 (1974); Schuchman, Confidentiality: Practice Issues in New Legislation,
50 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCmATRY 641 (1980); Shah, Privileged Communications, Confiden-
tiality and Privacy, 1 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: REs. & PRAc. 56, 59 (1969); Shuman, supra
note 4 at 679; Siegel, Privacy, Ethics and Confidentiality, 10 PROF. PsYCHOLOGY: REs.
& PRAc. 249 (1979); Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 Cmv. ST. L. Rav.
375, 380, 387 (1975).
"4 AMERICAN MEDICAL AssoCIATION, REvisED PRiNCH'LES OF MEDICAL ETmcs (1980).
"A physician shall respect the rights of patients. ... and shall safeguard patient
confidences within the constraints of the law." Id. at Principle IV.
IS AmERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL AssOCIATION, Ethical Principles of Psychologists (1981).
Principle V.-Confidentiality
Psychologists have a primary obligation to respect the confidentiality
of information obtained from persons in the course of their work as
psychologists. They reveal such information to others only with the consent
of the person or the person's legal representative, except in those unusual
circumstances in which not to do so would result in clear danger to the
person or to others. Where appropriate, psychologists inform their clients
of the legal limits of confidentiality.
a. Information obtained in clinical or consulting relationships, or
evaluative data concerning children, students, employees, and others, are
discussed only for professional purposes and only with persons clearly
concerned with the case. Written and oral reports present only data ger-
mane to the purposes of the evaluation and every effort is made to avoid
undue invasion of privacy.
b. Psychologists who present personal information obtained during
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trists,' 6 social workers, 7 and counselors,' recognize this obliga-
the course of professional work in writings, lectures, or other public forums
either obtain adequate prior consent to do so or adequately disguise all
identifying information.
c. Psychologists make provisions for maintaining confidentiality in
the storage and disposal of records.
d. When working with minors or other persons who are unable to
give voluntary, informed consent, psychologists take special care to protect
these persons' best interests.
'1 AmmucA PsYcmATRic AssociAnToN, The Principles of Medical Ethics with
Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry (1981).
Section 4.
A physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of
other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within
the constraints of the law.
1. Psychiatric records, including even the identification of a person
as a patient, must be protected with extreme care. Confidentiality is essen-
tial to psychiatric treatment. This is based in part on the special nature of
psychiatric therapy as well as on the traditional ethical relationship between
physician and patient. Growing concern regarding the civil rights of patients
and the possible adverse effects of computerization, duplication equipment,
and data banks makes the dissemination of confidential information an
increasing hazard. Because of the sensitive and private nature of the
information with which the psychiatrist deals, he/she must be circumspect
in the information that he/she chooses to disclose to others about a patient.
The welfare of the patient must be a continuing consideration.
2. A psychiatrist may release confidential information only with the
authorization of the patient or under proper legal compulsion. The contin-
uing duty of the psychiatrist to protect the patient includes fully apprising
him/her of the connotations of waiving the privilege of privacy. This may
become an issue when the patient is being investigated by a government
agency, is applying for a position, or is involved in legal action. The same
principles apply to the release of information concerning treatment to
medical departments of government agencies; business organizations, labor
unions, and insurance companies. Information gained in confidence about
patients seen in student health services should not be released without the
student's explicit permission.
3. Clinical and other materials used in teaching and writing must be
adequately disguised in order to preserve the anonymity of the individuals
involved.
4. The ethical responsibility of maintaining confidentiality holds equally
for the consultations in which the patient may not have been present and
in which the consultee was not a physician. In such instances, the physician
consultant should alert the consultee to his/her duty of confidentiality.
5. Ethically the psychiatrist may disclose only that information which
is relevant to a given situation. He/she should avoid offering speculation
as fact. Sensitive information such as an individual's sexual orientation or
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75
tion in codes of ethics. These ethical codes have several common
fantasy material is usually unnecessary.
6. Psychiatrists are often asked to examine individuals for security
purposes, to determine suitability for various jobs, and to determine legal
competence. The psychiatrist must fully describe the nature and purpose
and lack of confidentiality of the examination to the examinee at the
beginning of the examination.
7. Careful judgment must be exercised by the psychiatrist in order to
include, when appropriate, the parents or guardian in the treatment of a
minor. At the same time the psychiatrist must assure the minor proper
confidentiality.
8. Psychiatrists at times may find it necessary, in order to protect the
patient or the community from imminent danger, to reveal confidential
information disclosed by the patient.
9. When the psychiatrist is ordered by the court to reveal the confi-
dences entrusted to him/her by patients he/she may comply or he/she may
ethically hold the right to dissent within the framework of the law. When
the psychiatrist is in doubt, the right of the patient to confidentiality and,
by extension, to unimpaired treatment, should be given priority. The psy-
chiatrist should reserve the right to raise the question of adequate need for
disclosure. In the event that the necessity for legal disclosure is demon-
strated by the court, the psychiatrist may request the right to disclosure of
only that information which is relevant to the legal question at hand.
10. With regard for the person's dignity and privacy and with truly
informed consent, it is ethical to present a patient to a scientific gathering,
if the confidentiality of the presentation is understood and accepted by the
audience.
11. It is ethical to present a patient or former patient to a public
gathering or to the news media only if that patient is fully informed of
enduring loss of confidentiality, is competent, and consents in writing
without coercion.
12. When involved in funded research, the ethical psychiatrist will
advise human subjects of the funding source, retain his/her freedom to
reveal data and results, and follow all appropriate and current guidelines
relative to human subject protection.
13. Ethical consideration in medical practice preclude the psychiatric
evaluation of any adult charged with criminal acts prior to access to, or
availability of, legal counsel. The only exception is the rendering of care
to the person for the sole purpose of medical treatment.
17 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SocIA. Wo.KxRs, Code of Ethics (1979).
II. H.
H. Confidentiality and Privacy-The social worker should respect the
privacy of clients and hold in confidence all information obtained in the
course of professional service.
1. The social worker should share with others confidences revealed
by clients, without their consent, only for compelling professional reasons.
2. The social worker should inform clients fully about the limits of
1986-871 PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIALITY
features. First, they offer broad statements of the confidentiality
obligation. Second, they provide that the patient or client may
consent to the release of confidential information. Third, they
recognize exceptions to confidentiality. Generally these excep-
tions are stated in undefined terms such as "compelling profes-
sional reasons" 1 9 or "clear danger to the person or others.
' 20
B. Civil Liability
Civil suits based on the release of confidential information
are relatively rare, although the legal basis for such suits is fairly
confidentiality in a given situation, the purposes for which information is
obtained, and how it may be used.
3. The social worker should afford clients reasonable access to any
official social work records concerning them.
4. When providing clients with access to records, the social worker
should take due care to protect the confidences of others contained in
those records.
5. The social worker should obtain informed consent of clients before
taping, recording, or permitting third party observation of their activities.
1 AMiucm; PERSONNEL AND GuiDANCE AssocIATIoN, Ethical Standards
(1981).
2. The counseling relationship and information resulting therefrom
are to be kept confidential, consistent with the obligations of the member
as a professional person. In a group counseling setting, the counselor must
set a norm of confidentiality regarding all group participants' ... disclo-
sures.
5. Records of the counseling relationship, including interview notes,
test data, correspondence, tape recordings, and other documents, are to be
considered professional information for use in counseling and they should
not be considered a part of the records of the institution or agency in
which the counselor is employed unless specified by state statute or regu-
lation. Revelation to others of counseling material must occur only upon
the expressed consent of the client.
6. Use of data derived from a counseling relationship for purposes of
counselor training or research shall be confined to content that can be
disguised to ensure full protection of the identity of the subject client.
7. The member must inform the client of the purposes, goals, tech-
niques, rules of procedure and limitations that may affect the relationship
at or before the time that the counseling relationship is entered.
1, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SocIuL. WORKERS, supra note 17, at II H-1. See
A3,mRicAN PERSONNL AND GUIDANCE ASSOCIATION, supra note 18, at B-2.
!' AMERICAN PsYcHoLoGIcAL AssOCIATION, supra note 15, at Principle V. See
AMERICAN PsYcmATuc ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at Section 4-8.
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clear. 21 The reason for the lack of suits may be that the normal
course of a suit would probably result in additional release of
very private information. In addition, the nature and extent of
injury may be difficult to prove.22
C. Licensing
Licensing statutes may either directly require confidentiality
as a condition of maintaining a license or cite adherence to a
professional code of ethics as a necessary condition of licen-
sure.23 In either case, confidentiality appears to be protected
somewhat by licensure provisions. Given the extremely infre-
quent resort to licensure discipline in the medical and mental
professions, the threat of discipline likely has little impact on
the protection of confidences. However, professional norms,
expressed in codes of ethics, probably influence practice and
help protect confidentiality.
D. Privileges
This section examines the existence of a variety of privileges
adopted by statute. Like most states, Kentucky has statutory
privileges covering physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient
relationships. 24 Kentucky also has provided limited privileges for
some counselors.2 5 In addition to the statutory privileges, this
21 For an excellent review of liability for breach of confidentiality, see Eger,
Psychotherapists' Liability for Extrajudicial Breaches of Confidentiality, 18 ARiz. L.
REv. 1061 (1976). See also Cooper, The Physician's Dilemma: Protection of the Right
to Privacy, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 397 (1978); Note, Roe v. Doe: A Remedy for Disclosure
of Psychiatric Confidences, 29 Rtrroas L. REV. 190 (1975).
2 Patients' reluctance to file suit against psychotherapists and other reasons for
the low rate of malpractice among psychotherapists are discussed extensively in the first
chapter of S. SmirH & R. MEYER, LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND MENTAL HALTH: POLICY AND
PRACTICE (in press, N.Y. Univ. Press).
1 E.g., KY. REv. STAT. AN. § 319.082(o) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986)
[hereinafter KRS] (psychologists; "[i]mproperly divulged confidential information" is a
ground for license discipline); KRS § 311.597(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983) (physicians;
discipline is permitted for violating the American Medical Association (AMA) code of
ethics).
1' See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of these privileges.
KRS § 421.2151 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) (establishing a privilege for
communications between sexual assault counselor and sexual assault victim). See also
infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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section reviews two other potential sources of privileges, the
common law and the Constitution.
26
E. Physician-Patient Privilege
The physician-patient privilege is the oldest medical/psy-
chotherapy statutory privilege.2 7 The Kentucky statute provides
that confidential communications between physician-patient are
"placed upon the same basis as those provided by law between
attorney and client."*2 This statute defines a broad privilege by
tying the privilege to the traditionally strong attorney-client priv-
ilege. The analogy was in some ways, however, unfortunate. Not
only does it incorporate some of the uncertainties concerning
the attorney-client privilege (e.g. the future crime exceptions),
but it also creates uncertainties in determining how the analogy
applies to medicine and the physician-patient relationship be-
cause the relationship between hospital personnel, physicians,
and patients has no close analogy in law. The existence of
insurance and other third-party payers in medicine also makes the
attorney-client analogy difficult.
As we shall see, these questions have not been of great
importance because the wording of the privilege has been con-
strued to essentially eliminate the protection provided by it.29
F. Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege
All psychiatrists are physicians, and as such are included in
the physician-patient privilege. Perhaps mindful of past court
" In this section, the statutory privileges are identified without reference to the
large number of exceptions and limits which may apply. These are considered in detail
in following sections. For a recent broad review of the law of privilege, see Developments,
supra note 2.
See id. at 1460-63.
KRS § 213.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982). "For the purpose of this chapter,
the confidential relations and communications between physician and patient are placed
upon the same basis as those provided by law between attorney and client, and nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to require any such privileged communication to be
disclosed." Doctors of Osteopathy are also considered to be physicians. KRS §§ 205.510(8)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merriil 1982); 311.550(10) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983). The definition
of physicians as including osteopaths, however, does not clearly apply to the physician-
patient privilege. KRS § 213.200. Given the current status of the physician-patient
privilege, this is not an issue of great practical importance.
" See infra notes 124-125, and accompanying text.
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interpretations of the physician-patient privilege, in the mid-
1960s, Kentucky established a psychiatrist-patient privilege pro-
viding that a privilege exists for "communications relating to
diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental condition between
patient and psychiatrist, or between members of the patient's
family and the psychiatrist, or ... such persons who participate,
under the supervision of the psychiatrist, in the accomplishment
of the objectives of diagnosis or treatment.' '30 This statute was
based on the proposal by the Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry and a similar Connecticut statute.
3 1
Most privilege statutes are tied directly to licensure laws, and
the professionals authorized to receive privileged information are
defined by the license. That is not the case, however, with the
psychiatrist-patient privilege because psychiatrists need not be
especially licensed or certified beyond the M.D. license. Any
physician can claim to be a psychiatrist. The statute defines a
psychiatrist as any physician who devotes a "substantial portion
'o KRS § 421.215(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
(1) As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise:
(a) "Patient" means a person who, for the purpose of securing
diagnosis or treatment of his mental condition consults a psychiatrist;
(b) "Psychiatrist" means a person licensed to practice medicine who
devotes a substantial portion of his time to the practice of psychiatry, or
a person reasonably believed by the patient to be so qualified;
(c) "Authorized representative" means a person empowered by the
patient to assert the privilege granted by this section and, until given
permission by the patient to make disclosure, any person whose commu-
nications are made privileged by this section.
(2) Except as hereinafter provided, in civil and criminal cases, in
proceedings preliminary thereto, and in legislative and administrative pro-
ceedings, a patient, or his authorized representative, has a privilege to
refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing, communica-
tions relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental condition
between patient and psychiatrist, or between members of the patient's
family and the psychiatrist, or between any of the foregoing and such
persons who participate, under the supervision of the psychiatrist, in the
accomplishment of the objectives of diagnosis or treatment.
Id. See infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exceptions
under subsection (3).
1' See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEHMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRrv-
ILEGED COmmuImCATIONS IN THE PRACTICE OF PsYcHIATRY, REP. No. 45, at 112 (1960);
Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege, The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut
Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 175 (1962).
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of his time to the practice of psychiatry" or is reasonably
believed by a patient to be so qualified.32
In many ways this psychiatrist-patient privilege is strong
compared with other medical and psychotherapy privileges in
Kentucky. It contains, however, at least one extremely broad
explicit exception and a number of implicit exceptions, which
have weakened it.
33
G. Psychologist-Patient Privilege
Like the physician-patient privilege, the psychologist-patient
privilege is based on the attorney-client privilege. "The confi-
dential relations and communications between licensed psychol-
ogists or certificate holders and their clients are placed on the
same basis as those provided by the law between attorney and
client. ' 34 This privilege contains the same unfortunate analogy
to the attorney-client privilege as discussed previously, although
an analogy to the psychiatrist-patient privilege would be more
appropriate.3 5 An example of the breakdown of the analogy is
the use of group therapy and the question of whether members
of the group destroy the privilege.3 6 Furthermore, the psychol-
ogist-patient privilege recognizes a privilege attached to certain
12 KRS § 421.215(l)(b). See supra note 30.
" See infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exceptions
to this privilege. The major exception is that the privilege is lost when a patient is in
need of hospitalization. There are also a number of other exceptions to the privilege.
See infra notes 163-203 and accompanying text.
" KRS § 319.111 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). Until 1986, the statute
contained a provision that practically made it useless. See supra notes 127-129 and
accompanying text.
-1 When the psychologist-patient privilege was adopted, the psychiatrist-patient
privilege had not yet been passed, making an analogy to that privilege then impossible.
Such an analogy, however, would be appropriate now.
In a recent case the Kentucky Supreme Court apparently confused the psychiatrist-
patient and psychologist-patient privileges. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d
414 (Ky. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 245 (1986). Citing KRS § 421.215(2) (involving
the psychiatrist-patient privilege), the court went on to say "In Kentucky the psychiatrist-
patient privilege is placed 'upon the same basis as that provided by the law between
attorney and client.' See Southern Bluegrass Mental Health v. Angelucci, Ky. App., 609
S.W.2d 931 (1980)." Id. at 419. The cited case dealt both with the psychiatrist-patient
privilege and the psychologist-patient privilege.
" See infra at notes 209-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of group
therapy issues.
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psychologists (certificate holders) who will not be licensed for
independent practice in the future. At that point, a close analogy
to the attorney-client privilege is most difficult.
Until 1986, the psychologist privilege contained language that
threatened to destroy it altogether." A revision of 1986, however,
significantly reduced this possibility, although it did not eliminate
it altogether.3"
H. Social Worker Confidentiality
Certified social workers have a limited obligation to maintain
confidentiality when they are consulted by someone in their
"psychotherapeutic capacity." 3 9 Thus, at least a limited privilege
37 See KRS § 319.111 (Michie/Bobbs Merrill 1983). See also infra notes 127-129
and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text. In one case involving this
privilege, the issue of this construction apparently was not raised. See Southern Bluegrass
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Bd. v. Angelucci, 609 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. Ct.
App.), aff'd, 609 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1980).
KRS § 335.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986):
No licensee holding a certificate of qualification for independent
practice of clinical social work may disclose any information he may have
acquired from persons consulting him in his psychotherapeutic capacity
except:
(1) With the written consent of the person, or, in the case of death
or disability, of his authorized representative, or the beneficiary of an
insurance policy on his life, health, or physical condition;
(2) A communication that reveals the contemplation of a crime or a
harmful act;
(3) When the communication indicates that the person was the victim
or subject of a crime, the licensee shall be required to testify fully when prop-
erly subpoenaed by a court of competent jurisdiction in any examination, trial,
or other proceeding in which the commission of such a crime is the subject
of inquiry;
(4) Communications made in the course of a social work examination
ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction when the client has been
informed before the examination that any communications made during
the examination would not be privileged;
(5) When the licensee is a defendant in either a civil or criminal action;
(6) When the licensee is an employe [sic] of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky and is performing activities solely within the confines or under
the jurisdiction of the cabinet for human resources or its successor orga-
nization; and
(7) If the licensee has reasonable grounds to suspect that a child has been
abused or neglected, he shall report such information in compliance with pro-
visions of KRS § 620.030.
See generally Note, The Social Worker-Client Privilege Statutes: Underlying Justifications
and Practical Operations, 6 PROB. L.J. 243 (1985).
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exists for clinical social workers, although it applies only when
they are conducting psychotherapy. The statute creates an obli-
gation to maintain confidentiality which goes beyond the privi-
lege, yet a number of exceptions make it a very narrow privilege.
40
L Counselors
Certified school counselors, regularly employed by a public
or private school, are "immune from disclosing ... any com-
munication made by the student counselee to the counselor in
his professional character, or the advice thereon. ' '41 This statute,
by itself, does not create a general obligation of confidentiality,
but applies only in "any civil or criminal court proceeding." 42
J. Sexual Assault Counselors
The most recent addition to the list of privileges is that
between sexual assault counselor and victim. 43 The privilege ap-
1' See infra notes 146-153 and accompanying text for a discussion of the very
broad exceptions to and limitations on this privilege.
4' KRS § 421.216 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
Any certified counselor who meets the requirements issued pursuant
to the authority of KRS 161.030, and who is duly appointed and regularly
employed for the purpose of counseling in a public or private school of
this state, shall be immune from disclosing in any civil or criminal court
proceeding, without the consent of the student counselee, any communi-
cation made by the student counselee to the counselor in his professional
character, or the advice thereon. If the student counselee is less than
eighteen (18) years of age, neither the communication nor advice thereon
shall be disclosed in the court proceeding without the consent of the student
counselee and his parent or legal guardian.
Id.
4 Id.
4 KRS § 421.2151 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
(1) As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have
the meaning given to them in this subsection:
(a) "Rape crisis center." Any office, institution or center offering
assistance to victims of sexual assault and their families through crisis
intervention, medical and legal accompaniment and follow-up counseling;
(b) "Sexual assault counselor." A person who is engaged in any
office, institution or center defined as a rape crisis center under this section,
who has undergone forty (40) hours of training and is under the control
of a direct services supervisor of a rape crisis center, whose primary purpose
is the rendering of advice, counseling or assistance to victims of sexual
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plies to communications to someone employed in a rape crisis
center "who has undergone forty (40) hours of training," who
is under the control of "a direct service supervisor of a rape
crisis center," and whose primary purpose is to render assistance
to victims of sexual assault. 4
K. Other Privileges
A number of other legal provisions either protect the confi-
dentiality of or establish limited privileges for some forms of
therapy. This protection may exist because other professionals
who engage in treatment or counseling also have privileges,
because certain kinds of treatment or records are specifically
protected (even if not conducted by a privileged professional),
or because the communication is with an assistant of a profes-
sional included within a privilege.
Professionals other than psychotherapists commonly engage
in counseling. Ministers, for example, often provide counseling
service and a number of pastoral counselors now spend full time
assault;
(c) "Victim." A person who consults a sexual assault counselor for
the purpose of securing advice, counseling or assistance concerning a
mental, physical, or emotional condition caused by a sexual assault; and
(d) "Confidential communication" means all information received by
a sexual assault counselor which has been transmitted between the victim
and the sexual assault counselor which:
1. Was believed by the victim to have been disclosed in confidence;
2. The victim believes will not be disclosed to any other person except
persons to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose for which the victim sought the assistance of the sexual
assault counselor; and
3. The victim believes will not be disclosed by any other person present
at the time the victim is disclosing the information to the sexual assault
counselor.
Information which must be disclosed pursuant to subsection (3) of
this section shall not be considered as a confidential communication.
(2) A sexual assault counselor has a privilege not to be examined as
a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written
consent of the victim being counseled by the counselor as to any confiden-
tial communication made by the victim to the counselor or as to any
advice, report or working paper given or made in the course of the
consultation.
See infra notes 155-159 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exceptions.
- KRS § 421.2151(l)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
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providing counseling and therapy. Kentucky statutes have estab-
lished a privilege covering ministers which covers confidential
communications to a minister, priest, or rabbi of "an established
church or religious organization." The privilege applies only if
the information is received in the practitioner's "professional
capacity," and its disclosure would "violate a sacred or moral
trust. ' 45 It is not clear whether "in his professional capacity" is
broad enough to include communications to a full-time pastoral
counselor or whether "professional capacity" applies only to
ministers in a more traditional professional/pastoral role. A
disclosure must also violate a "sacred or moral trust," suggesting
that, unlike other privileges, this privilege in part belongs to the
professional. The application of the statute to "an established
church or religious organization" may raise first amendment
establishment of religion questions about this privilege.
Certain kinds of treatment are protected by limited confi-
dentiality. Drug and alcohol treatment, which has limited pro-
tection of confidentiality in federal statutes, is an example. 46 The
statute technically, however, does not establish a privilege due
to the provision for release of the information subject to court
order.
47
Another example of limited protection is the privilege that
covers communications involved in medical quality assurance
reviews within health care institutions. Kentucky provides for
" KRS § 421.210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
No ... ordained minister, priest, rabbi or accredited practitioner of an
established church or religious organization [shall] be required to testify in
any civil or criminal case or proceedings preliminary thereto, or any ad-
ministrative proceeding, concerning any information confidentially com-
municated to him in his professional capacity under such circumstances that
to disclose the information would violate a sacred or moral trust.
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3, ee-3 (1985); Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 2.67 (1985). For a good review of this law, see
Saltzman, Protection for the Child or the Parent? The Conflict Between the Federal
Drug and Alcohol Abuse Confidentiality Requirements and the State Child Abuse and
Neglect Reporting Laws, 1985 S. ILL. U.L.J. 181. On the other hand, when the effort
is to obtain drugs, the result is much different. Kentucky provides that "[i]nformation
communicated to a practitioner in an effort unlawfully to procure a controlled substance
... shall not be deemed a privileged communication." KRS § 218A.280 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1982).
47 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3(b)(2)(c) (1986).
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such a privilege. 48 A previous incarnation of this statute was
declared unconstitutional by the Kentucky Supreme Court, 49 and
the revised version may not completely meet constitutional re-
quirements.50 In any event, these statutes do not protect the
patient information, but rather the deliberations and conclusions
of the review committees. They are therefore of limited value in
protecting patient confidences.
Other medical professionals such as nurses, physical thera-
pists, technicians, and chiropractors do not have direct privi-
leges. Doctors of osteopathy, however, may be considered
"physicians" and might be covered by the physician-patient
privilege to the extent it exists.5 1 In some instances those medical
professionals not covered by a privilege may be included under
the privilege of another professional. This may occur when the
professional is assisting a physician with the treatment of a
patient.52 For example, a nurse may be included under the psy-
chiatrist-patient privilege while the nurse is directly assisting the
psychiatrist in providing treatment. The extent to which assist-
ants can be included within a professional privilege, however, is
not entirely clear. The privilege undoubtedly applies when the
assistant is present with the privileged professional and partici-
pating in the treatment; yet it is less clear whether a privilege
would apply when the privileged professional is not present or
is only vaguely directing the activities of the nurse or other
KRS § 311.377 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983).
(2) The proceedings, records, opinions, conclusions and recommen-
dations of any committee, board, commission, professional standards re-
view organization, or other entity, as referred to in subsection (I) of this
section shall be confidential and privileged and shall not be subject to
discovery, subpoena, or introduction into evidence, in any civil action in
any court or in any administrative proceeding before any board, body, or
committee, whether federal, state, county, or city. This subsection shall
not apply to any proceedings or matters governed exclusively by federal
law or federal regulation.
Id.
9 McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977) (declaring an earlier version of
this section unconstitutional for being improperly labeled and being state legislation in
an area preempted by federal law).
0 It is not certain that the revised version of KRS § 311.377 would survive another
constitutional attack.
1' See supra note 28.
S2 WIoMo1RE, supra note 2, at § 2381.
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professional. The more one acts as an independent professional,
the less one is really assisting and therefore the less likely anoth-
er's privileges will apply.
A variety of other Kentucky provisions protect some infor-
mation gathered as part of state functions. For example, infor-
mation related to civil commitment 3 and provided to the Cabinet
for Human Resources5 4 is protected.
Although statutes are the most common source of testimonial
privileges, privileges may also arise from the common law or the
United States Constitution.5 Courts and commentators for the
most part have been critical of broad medical privileges 5 6 and
therefore it is not surprising that they have been reluctant to
adopt common law or constitutional medical privileges. A few
courts have, however, provided for limited common law and
constitutional psychotherapist-patient privileges.5 7 Kentucky courts
apparently have not yet been called upon to consider the exist-
ence of such privileges as a matter of state law, however, the
Sixth Circuit has adopted a common law psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 8
L. The Common Law
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to expand the com-
mon law privileges beyond the attorney-client and husband-wife
privileges because privileges deprive courts of material evidence.5 9
In Kentucky, as in other states, this reluctance has been coupled
with a willingness by legislative bodies to provide statutory priv-
ileges. In a few states, and in federal courts, the existence of
common law privileges has been considered, although there is
not yet a broadly accepted common law therapy privilege.
" KRS § 202A.091 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982). But see KRS § 202A.096 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1982) for limitations on this privilege.
" KRS § 205.175 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
" See infra notes 59-121 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9.
See infra notes 59-121 and accompanying text.
In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
;, Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 7 (1954) (involving the husband-wife
privilege); WIGMORE, supra note 2, at §§ 2311, 2326.
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In Allred v. State,60 the Supreme Court of Alaska recognized
a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege. 61 The issue arose
in this criminal case when the trial court ordered a social worker
(who was assisting a psychiatrist) to testify regarding her con-
versations with the defendant. The lower court found that no
statutory privilege applied. 62 After reviewing the history of com-
mon law privileges, however, the Supreme Court of Alaska
concluded that a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege
was justified on the basis of the Wigmore criteria.63 The court
held that the privilege applied only to psychiatrists and psychol-
ogists who do therapy as opposed to other professionals who do
counseling. 64
In In re Zuniga,61 patients' records, subpoenaed by two grand
juries as part of an investigation of insurance billing fraud,6
were held by therapists who refused to release them. The Sixth
Circuit noted that the protection of confidentiality is essential
60 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
11 Id. at 418. The court could not agree on whether the privilege was broad enough
to cover the communications to a social worker, as opposed to a psychotherapist. Two
justices felt that communications to social workers were not covered by the common
law privileges while two were of the opposite opinion, because in this case there was a
therapeutic relationship and the social worker was the psychiatrist's "alter ego". Id. at
426. One justice found the communication between Allred and the social worker to be
protected by the statute. Id. at 422.
A lower court in Illinois some years earlier also recognized a psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Binder v. Ruvell, Civil Docket 52C2535 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Illinois,
June 24, 1952), with Judge Harry M. Fisher presiding, reported in Note, Confidential
Communications to a Psychotherapist: A New Testimonial Privilege, 47 Nw. U.L. REv.
384, 384-85 (1952).
12 554 P.2d at 415.
63 Id. at 416-18. The court relied upon Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 279
(D.C. Cir. 1959) (Fahy, J., concurring) and Cook v. Carrol, I.R. 515, 525 (Ir. H. Ct.
1945) as examples of judicially created common law priest-penitent privileges. It also
noted McTaggart v. McTaggart, 2 All E.R. 754, 755 (C.A. 1948) as an example of the
English judicial doctrine of "conversation without prejudice" covering statements made
to marriage counselors attempting to effectuate reconciliation, and In re Kryschuk and
Zulynik, 14 D.L.R. 2d 676 (Sask. Magist. Ct. 1958) as establishing a similar Canadian
doctrine. Id.
554 P.2d at 418-22.
,1 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
Id. See Note, The Case for a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege That
Protects Patient Identity, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1217 [hereinafter Patient Identity Privilege];
Note, Evidence-The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege-The Sixth Circuit Does the De-
cent Thing, 33 KAN. L. REv. 385 (1985).
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to successful psychotherapy and that the "inability to obtain
effective psychiatric treatment may preclude the enjoyment and
exercise of many fundmental freedoms." 67 The court also noted
the wide acceptance of the importance of privileges covering
psychotherapy. On these bases the court recognized a limited
common law privilege covering psychotherapy. 6 The court did
not describe fully all the limits on the privilege, but suggested
that it would consider a broad utilitarian approach. 69 For ex-
ample, the court held that the names of patients and the existence
of a therapy relationship would not be protected by the privilege
even though the very fact that someone was in therapy could
itself be highly embarrassing or harmful. 70 The court specifically
rejected the existence of a medical or physician-patient privilege,
limiting the decision to communications between psychothera-
pists and their patients. 7' The court did not explain completely
the requirements for claiming the privilege, but seemed to adopt
the approach taken by Rule 504 of the rules proposed by the
Supreme Court (but not accepted by Congress). In re Zuniga is
an important case in considering privileges in Kentucky because
it establishes a limited psychotherapist-patient privilege for fed-
eral courts in the Sixth Circuit.
M. Constitutional Privacy and Confidentiality and Privileges
When the state obtains or shares highly sensitive medical or
psychotherapy information, the constitutional right of privacy
may be violated by requiring the release of very personal infor-
mation (information privacy) or by imposing significant burdens
on the decision to seek medical treatment or psychotherapy
(autonomy privacy). For example, the threatened release of in-
formation from therapy may make some patients reluctant to
'" 714 F.2d at 639. " 'Mental Illness may prevent one from understanding religious
and political ideas, or interfere with the ability to communicate ideas. Some level of
mental health is necessary to be able to form belief and value systems and to engage in
rational thought.' " Id. (quoting Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 27 (1980)).
714 F.2d at 639.
"Id.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 63940.
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seek psychotherapy at all or may make effective psychotherapy
difficult because of the absence of full disclosure or interference
with a trusting relationship between therapist and patient. 72
The Supreme Court has declined to provide substantial pri-
vacy protection to medical data, but has hinted that, at some
point, the release of this information by a state could become
unconstitutional. In Whalen v. Roe,73 the Court permitted the
state to collect and maintain certain information concerning
"dangerous" drug prescriptions as part of the state effort to
control drug abuse.74 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,75 the
Court also upheld the state collection of information from phy-
sicians performing abortions. 76 The Court emphasized, however,
the importance of security provisions to maintain confidential-
ity.77 For example, the computerized prescription form7 in
Whalen and the abortion reporting system 79 in Planned Parent-
12 For a discussion of the issues regarding constitutional privacy, see Smith, Con-
stitutional Privacy and Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1980); Winslade &
Ross, Privacy, Confidentiality, and Autonomy in Psychotherapy, 64 NEB. L. Rnv. 578
(1985). Other recent commentaries concerning privacy and therapy include L. Everstine,
D. Everstine, Heymann, True, Frey, Johnson & Seiden, Privacy and Confidentiality in
Psychotherapy, 35 AM. PSYCHo LoGisT 828 (1980); Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are
Legal and Psychological Concepts Compatible?, 62 NEB. L. Rnv. 455 (1983); Note,
Privacy in Personal Medical Information: A Diagnosis, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 394 (1980-
81).
7 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
74 Id. at 603-04 (holding that patient identification requirements of the New York
State Controlled Substances Act of 1972 were constitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment).
- 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
76 Id. at 80 (holding that reporting requirements "that are reasonably directed to
the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality
and privacy are permissible").
" Id.
-' 429 U.S. at 600-01 (1977). The Court approved a similar security arrangement
in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977), which directed an
archival staff with an " 'unblemished record for discretion,' " to review the former
President's papers and to return to him any that were personal. Id. at 462-65 (quoting
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 365 (D.D.C. 1976)).
79 428 U.S. at 81. The state claimed two purposes for requiring physicians and
health facilities to compile data concerning abortions: to preserve maternal health and
life by advancing medical knowledge and to monitor abortions to assure that they were
performed in accordance with the law. Id. at 79. The Court held that "[r]ecordkeeping
and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal
health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible."
Id. at 80.
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hood included security provisions to avoid improper release of
the medical information. In both cases, the Court indicated that
the absence of security arrangements to preserve confidentiality
could seriously threaten privacy and thus would present a diffi-
cult constitutional question.8 , In addition, the medical informa-
tion gathered in those cases was not highly personal, as would
be information from psychotherapy.
A number of lower courts have considered the question of
medical information and privacy. The cases recognizing a privacy
interest in preventing the release of information usually have
focused on information from psychotherapy rather than physical
treatment. In the following paragraphs, this Article reviews first
several cases that have recognized some limited right of privacy
to this information and then a few cases that have recognized a
constitutionally based psychotherapist-patient privilege.
In Hawaii Psychiatric Society v. Ariyoshi,8' a federal court
enjoined the state of Hawaii from enforcing a statute that per-
mitted the issuance of "administrative inspection warrants" to
review the mental health records of Medicaid patients . 2 The
court held that "[a]n individual's decisions whether or not to
seek the aid of a psychiatrist, and whether or not to communi-
cate certain personal information to that psychiatrist, fall squarely
within" the constitutional right of privacy. 83 Characterizing the
significance of the privacy interest threatened by the statute, the
court stated, "[n]o area could be more deserving of protection
than communications between a psychiatrist and his patient. ' 84
Merriken v. Cressman85 involved a junior high school pro-
gram designed to identify emotionally handicapped students and
- 429 U.S. at 601; 428 U.S. at 81.
" 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979).
. Id. at 1032.
'' Id. at 1038.
'A Id. at 1038. In the court's opinion, Hawaii's scheme for inspecting psychiatric
records would interfere with therapy by destroying a patient's willingness to disclose
personal matters. Balanced against the patient's interest in privacy was the state's interest
in protecting the Medicaid program from fraud, which the court accepted as compelling.
Nevertheless, the court held that the state had not shown that warrants to inspect the
confidential medical records of a psychiatrist were necessary to advance this compelling
interest. Id. at 1038-41.
1 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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provide "necessary interventions" to prevent drug abuse.16 To
identify those with a propensity toward drug abuse, students
were expected to complete a questionnaire dealing with matters
of a personal nature and were asked for information regarding
their emotional states.87 The court acknowledged the state's in-
terest in correcting drug abuse, but doubted whether the program
would serve this objective s.8 The court also noted that the state's
subpoena power presented a threat to the confidentiality of the
information. 89 Therefore, the court issued an injunction pro-
hibiting the state from further efforts to collect sensitive psycho-
logical and emotional data. 90
The court in Lora v. Board of Education91 also found that
the constitutional right of privacy protects records containing
psychological information.92 The court noted the importance of
privacy in protecting information a patient reveals to a psycho-
therapist.9 3 In granting the plaintiff's motion to review the files
of fifty students, the court relied primarily on the scheme to
ensure autonomy. 94 There was a genuine need for the informa-
tion, and no danger of invasion of privacy existed because the
information would not be released in a personally identifiable
form.9
Id. at 914.
1, Id. at 918.
11 Id. at 920.
19 Id. at 916.
10 Id. at 922.
91 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). In a suit against the New York City School
Board alleging discrimination in the evaluation and placement of handicapped children,
plaintiffs moved to compel production of the diagnostic and referral files of fifty students
that contained sensitive psychological information. Id. at 568.
92 Id.
91 Id. at 571.
Id. at 582-83.
In addition to requiring that all identifying data be retracted and the files
coded, the court may order that the information they contain be used
solely for the purpose of the pending litigation; strict confidentiality may
be enforced under penalty of contempt; the number of copies to be made
of the documents may be rigidly regulated; files submitted to the court
may be ordered sealed; and all material may be required to be returned to
the defendants immediately upon conclusion of this suit. Under such a
protective scheme the invasion of the children's privacy will be minimal.
Id.
, See id. But see J.P. v. Desanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), where the court
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In McKenna v. Fargo," applicants for positions as firefight-
ers objected to the city's insistence that they undergo psycho-
logical testing as a prerequisite to being hired and to the city's
maintenance of the psychological profiles after hiring decisions
were made.9 7 The court acknowledged that the constitutional
right of privacy limits the ability of the state to collect and
maintain certain kinds of very personal information concerning
emotional and mental conditions, including the kind of infor-
mation elicited through psychological testing. 98 Nevertheless, the
court upheld the psychological testing of the applicants due to
the state's overriding interest in ensuring the selection of fire-
fighters who would be emotionally stable under stress99 because
firefighting is inherently dangerous and pressured.'00
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,icn a some-
what similar case, objection was raised to the release of sensitive
medical records.0 2 The court found the information protected
by the right of privacy, but found that a strong government
interest and a safeguard to prevent release of the information
justified the intrusion. 03
A few courts also have recognized a constitutional psycho-
therapist-patient privilege; California was the first. In In re
Lifschutz,"°4 one of Dr. Lifschutz's psychiatric patients filed a
permitted "social histories" of juveniles compiled for the juvenile court to be distributed
among a number of government agencies. Id. at 1090.
',' 451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979).
,7 Id. at 1358.
" Id. at 1381.
Id.
The court characterized the state interest in psychologically screening applicants
as "of the highest order" and "of an importance that would be found in very few
occupations." The constitutionality of the psychological testing, however, was condi-
tioned on the city's development of formal plans and regulations to preserve the confi-
dentiality of the information obtained during the testing. The court further suggested
that the city limit access to the information to the psychologist reviewing the applicant
and to the city employees who had specific reason to use the data. As final precautions,
the court recommended that the city retain the records only for a specified period of
time and that it establish a system for destroying those records not necessary to serve
the compelling state interest. Id. at 1377-82.
638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
2 d.
2.) Id. at 580-82.
1'4 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970).
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damage suit against another party for assault, claiming severe
mental and emotional distress.lt When the defendant tried to
take Dr. Lifschutz's deposition regarding his treatment of the
patient, the doctor refused to answer any questions regarding
the patient and refused to produce any of the requested rec-
ords. 10 6 The patient neither directly consented nor objected to
the release of information about his treatment. Dr. Lifschutz
appealed a citation for contempt. Acknowledging the sensitive
nature of the confidences that patients reveal in psychotherapy,
the California Supreme Court indicated that the constitutional
right of privacy protects those communications. 10 7 The Lifschutz
decision, in effect, recognized a constitutional psychotherapist-
patient privilege.
The court, however, rejected Dr. Lifchutz's argument for an
absolute psychotherapist-patient privilege, 05 holding that the
constitutional right can be limited by the state when necessary
to protect or to advance a "legitimate governmental interest."' 09
The court thus recognized a patient/litigant exception to the
constitutional privilege, but took care to emphasize that it would
not sanction all inquiries into a patient's confidences under the
guise of a "legitimate governmental interest.""10
In Caesar v. Mountanos,"' a case factually similar to Lif-
schutz, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the constitutional right of privacy protects the confi-
dentiality of psychotherapist-patient communications. Dr. Cae-
sar had refused to answer questions about one of his patients,
105 Id.
106 Id. at 559.
10 Id. at 567-68.
10 Id. at 573. "In sum, we conclude that no constitutional right enables the
psychotherapist to assert an absolute privilege concerning all psychotherapeutic com-
munications. We do not believe the patient-psychotherapist privilege should be frozen
into the rigidity of absolutism." Id.
109 Id. at 563.
110 Id. at 569-70. The court held that even when the state demonstrates a compelling
interest requiring disclosure of the confidences of therapy, it must limit its inquiry into
the confidential information as narrowly as possible to avoid unnecessary invasions of
privacy. In the context of the patient/litigant exception, for instance, the state may
conduct only a "limited inquiry into the confidences of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship." Id. at 567.
1-- 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
[Vol. 75
PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIALITY
was held in contempt of the California state court, and then
took the federal privacy claims to federal court.'1 2 Although the
Ninth Circuit agreed that confidentiality is essential to psychoth-
erapy and that the very nature of the communications invokes
the constitutional right of privacy, it rejected the argument that
an absolute privilege existed."13 Instead, the court held that a
privilege existed, but may be limited when necessary to advance
a compelling state interest.14 Apparently, the state's interest in
obtaining all material evidence, coupled with the implicit waiver
of the privilege by the patient in bringing her mental condition
into issue, provided the necessary basis for requiring the disclo-
sure.
In In re B,"5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, without a
majority opinion, also recognized a constitutionally based psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege." 6 Unlike the patients in Caesar
and Lifschutz, the patient in In re B was not a party to the
lawsuit for which her records were sought. Rather, the case
involved a juvenile delinquency proceeding concerning "B."" l7
During the course of the predisposition investigation, juvenile court
personnel discovered that B's mother had received psychiatric treat-
ment."8 Although it ruled that the state's statutory doctor-patient
privilege did not apply to the disputed records, the court held that
the constitutional right of privacy protected the information from
involuntary disclosure." 9 Noting that psychotherapy requires pa-
tients to reveal the most intimate details of their lives, the court
concluded that the constitutional right of privacy includes protec-
11Z Id. at 1065. The patient had filed suit against third parties alleging that two
separate automobile accidents had caused her "pain and suffering not limited to her
physical ailments."
"I Id. at 1067-68.
1'" Id. The court proceeded to evaluate the state interest in obtaining disclosure and
found that an invasion of the confidences of Dr. Ceasar's patient was justified. In
reaching this conclusion, however, the court failed to identify precisely the state interest
that would be furthered by the release of information. Id. at 1069.
394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978) (no majority opinion).
"I ld.
11 Id. at 420-21.
"I Id. Dr. Roth, acting for the director of the clinic, was ordered by the juvenile
court to turn over the mother's psychiatric records. Dr. Roth refused to do so without
the consent of the mother and was cited for contempt of the juvenile court. Id.
" Id. at 425-26.
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tion of the confidences revealed in therapy.' 20 In In re B, the state
sought access to patient's psychiatric files in the disposition phase
of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The importance of juvenile
proceedings and the quasi-criminal nature of delinquency pro-
ceedings emphsized the state's interest in obtaining all relevant in-
formation.' 2 ' The decision thus represents a significant endorse-
ment of the privacy of communications between patient and
psychotherapist.
Superficially, there appears to be substantial protection for
the confidences of therapy, especially through privileges. Ken-
tucky statutes provide for a number of such privileges. These
privileges might be supplemented by common law or constitu-
tional privileges. This Article turns next to the ways in which
the protections of privileges and confidentiality are limited.
III. ON TAKiNG AWAY: LIMITATIONS ON PRrViLEGES
A. Self-Destructing Privileges
Some of the medical and psychotherapy privileges in Ken-
tucky are so restricted that they are virtually self-destructing.
Foremost among these is the physician-patient privilege.'2 The
"I Id. The court conceded that recognition of constitutional protection for the
confidences of therapy might hamper the efforts of juvenile courts to obtain necessary
information, but emphasized that the right of privacy must prevail over the interest of
the court in obtaining the privileged information. The court also noted that the state's
interest in securing access to a patient's files in such case was diminished because, as a
practical matter, courts could obtain most of the desired information from sources other
than the psychotherapist. Id. at 426.
2I Because the information concerning the mother's therapy would have been used only
in a disposition report in a juvenile proceeding, the court could have assured the
confidentiality of the material by sealing the patient's records and by not disclosing the
information at a public hearing. Despite the state's significant interest and the means
available to limit disclosure, the court rejected the state's request because of the possi-
bility that even a limited breach of the confidentiality of psychotherapist-patient com-
munications could involve a significant invasion of privacy. Id. at 425-26. Not all courts
have been enthusiastic about a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege. See Bre-
mer v. State, 307 A.2d 503, 529 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973); cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930
(1974) (denying the existence of a constitutional psychiatrist-patient privilege). Cf. Felber
v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Conn. 1970) (the right of privacy does not extend
protection to the physician-patient relationship, even when the physician is a psychiatrist).
I- KRS § 213.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982).
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Kentucky courts have construed the language of that privilege
so as to make it nearly inoperative.'2 The physician-patient
privilege contains two troublesome provisions. The statutory
language begins: "[flor the purposes of this chapter," and ends:
"nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any such
privileged communication to be disclosed." 1 24 In 1941, the then
Court of Appeals essentially gutted the physician-patient privi-
lege by ruling that this language meant that the privilege applied
only to the accumulation of vital statistics and did not provide
for a general physician-patient privilege.' 21 Thus, Kentucky rec-
ognizes no general physician-patient privilege.
The psychologist-patient privilege, until very recently, con-
tained the same two phrases. 26 In 1986, the General Assembly
removed the first and more troublesome phrase, "[flor the pur-
pose of KRS 319.005 to 319.131," which made it appear that
the privilege applied only to the process of licensing psycholo-
gists. 127 Unfortunately the final provision of the privilege, "noth-
ing in this chapter shall be construed to require any such privileged
communication to be disclosed," remains.'2 Of course, nothing
in chapter 319 requires the disclosure of privileged communica-
tions. Rather, that obligation arises out of the general duty to
provide evidence in court. Therefore, the courts might give the
psychologist-patient privilege the same treatment as the physi-
cian-patient privilege (effective abolition of the privilege). Fur-
thermore, the psychologist-patient privilege depends for its
substance on the attorney-client privilege.129 This approach could
be limiting because the analogy is not a very good one and the
' See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
' KRS § 213.200.
Williams v. Tarter, 151 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Ky. 1941); Boyd v. Winn, 150 S.W.2d
648, 650 (Ky. 1941).
1:1 KRS § 319.111 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983).
'12 KRS § 319.111 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). A case involving this statute
did not consider the issue of the opening and closing phrases of the privilege. See
Southern Bluegrass Mental Health & Mental Retardation Bd. v. Angelucci, 609 S.W.2d
931, 933 (Ky. Ct. App.), aff'd, 609 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1980).
': KRS § 319.111 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
"The confidential relations and communications between licensed psychologists
or certificate holders and their clients are placed upon the same basis as those provided
by the law between attorney and client .... " KRS § 319.111 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1986).
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nature of the protections required in legal counseling and in
psychotherapy are quite different. For example, the attorney-
client privilege does not ordinarily preclude disclosure of whether
an attorney-client relationship exists, but the very fact that a
patient is in therapy may be quite damaging even if the details
of the communication are not revealed. 30 The attorney-client
privilege does not include discussion of future crimes, and yet
psychologists may often be informed of anti-social, criminal
conduct in the course of therapy; criminal conduct which may
very well be continuing, therefore be a form of future crime.'
3'
In addition, the mode of therapy is frequently unlike the method
of legal representation. For example, group therapy is a common
form of psychotherapy with no clear analogy to which the at-
torney-client privilege can apply. Furthermore, third-party pay-
ment for services is more common in psychology than in law,
raising difficult questions about the effect of disclosure of in-
formation to third-party payers.' 32
B. Explicit Exceptions
Both the physician-patient and the psychologist-patient priv-
ileges may contain provisions that significantly limit their utility.
To the extent that the psychologist-patient privilege is recog-
nized, it includes the same exceptions as the attorney-client priv-
ilege.133 Other privileges contain explicit exceptions which
11 In In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983),
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the release of the fact of therapy
could be distressing. However, the court noted that the patients already had released
that information to their health insurance companies. Id. at 640. See Patient Identity
Privilege, supra note 66.
1 For example, therapists might be told of continuing criminal activity such as
petty theft, exhibitionism, homosexual activity, or drug use. The future crime exception
may be considerably more important in therapy than in legal counseling. The fact that
those entering therapy, at least during the initial stages, may continue this criminal
activity should not destroy the privilege.
132 Issues regarding group therapy and privilege-related difficulties associated with
third-party payers are discussed infra at notes 209-216 and accompanying text.
33 This might include loss of the privilege when there is discussion of future illegal
acts, see Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Ky. 1970); when third parties (including
bystanders) hear the conversation, see Vanhorn v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.2d 372, 375
(Ky. 1931); or when the professional has evidence concerning the mental condition of
the client, see Wicks v. Dean, 44 S.W. 397, 398 (Ky. 1898). It is very difficult to
determine how the many rules which have grown up around the attorney-client privilege
would be applied to psychologists.
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dramatically limit their applicability. Notably, the psychiatrist-
patient privilege,3 4 the social worker privilege, 135 and the rape-
counselor privilege 36 all have this difficulty.
The psychiatrist-patient privilege explicitly provides for three
exceptions. The privilege is lost: 1) when the patient introduces
his or her mental condition as an element of a claim or defense
and the benefits of disclosure outweigh the risk of harm from
the disclosure; 3 7 2) when a psychiatric examination is ordered
by the court and the patient is informed the communication will
not be privileged;1 31 and 3) "[w]hen a psychiatrist, in the course
of diagnosis or treatment of the patient, determines that the
patient is in need of admission to or commitment to a hospital
for care of the patient's mental illness.' ' 39 This last provision,
taken literally, means that the privilege is lost whenever a psy-
chiatrist determines that a patient is "in need of admission to"
a hospital for the care of mental illness. 4° Although an argument
could be made providing a narrow exception for civil commit-
ment cases, the statute is not so limited. There is no good
,4 KRS § 421.215 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
" KRS § 335.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
VI KRS § 421.2151 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
"7 KRS § 421.215. The exceptions provided for the psychiatrist-patient privilege are
as follows.
(3) There shall be no privilege for any relevant communications under
this section:
(a) When a psychiatrist, in the course of diagnosis or treatment of
the patient, determines that the patient is in need of admission to or
commitment to a hospital for care of the patient's mental illness;
(b) If a judge finds that the patient, after having been informed that
the communications would not be privileged, has made communications to
a psychiatrist in the course of a psychiatric examination ordered by the
court provided that such communications shall be admissible only on issues
involving the patient's mental condition;
(c) In a civil proceeding in which the patient introduces his mental
condition as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's
death, when said condition is introduced by any party claiming or defending
through or as a beneficiary of the patient, and the judge finds that it is
more important to the interests of justice that the communication be
disclosed than that the relationship between patient and psychiatrist be
protected.
The remainder of the privilege statute is quoted supra note 30.
V: KRS § 421.215(3)(b).
KRS § 421.215(3)(a).
", Id.
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justification for this broad exception to the privilege. The model
statute from which the language was taken is said to provide the
exception "only for the purpose of securing hospitalization or
instituting commitment proceedings."1141 The actual language of
the exception, however, does not make this limit clear and a
court might determine that the privilege is lost completely (for
all purposes) whenever a patient is admitted to a hospital for
mental illness. The other exceptions to the psychiatrist-patient
privilege are more narrowly drawn.
One difficulty with the psychiatrist-patient privilege is deter-
mining who is a psychiatrist for purposes of the statute. The
statute provides that "a person licensed to practice medicine
who devotes a substantial portion of his time to the practice of
psychiatry, or a person reasonably believed by the patient to be
so qualified" is a psychiatrist. 42 Because no special certification
or licensing is required for a psychiatrist, it is often difficult for
a patient to reasonably determine whether someone devotes a
"substantial portion" of his time to psychiatry. In addition, the
concept of "substantial portion of his time" is itself unclear and
does not promote certainty in understanding which professionals
qualify for coverage under this provision 43 The saving provision
is that the patient need only "reasonably believe" the therapist
meets the qualifications.' 44
The social worker privilege, by its terms, applies only to
social workers who are certified for the "independent practice
of clinical social work" when they are consulted in a "psychoth-
erapeutic capacity."' 45 In addition, the statute lists seven excep-
tions to the privilege. 46 Most of these exceptions are relatively
limited; for example, information may be revealed when there
is consent to the release of information, 147 when the client is
'4' Goldstein & Katz, supra note 31, at 186.
42 KRS § 421.215(l)(b).
143 Id.
'4 Id.
145 KRS § 335.170.
14 Id.
.41 KRS § 335.170(1). The consent must be in writing. In case of death or disability,
the consent may come from "his [the patient's] authorized representative, or the bene-
ficiary of an insurance policy on his life, health or physical condition." Id.
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informed that the examination is pursuant to a court order, 148
or when there is child abuse or neglect.1 49 Other exceptions,
however, are potentially quite broad and will remove the pro-
tection of confidentiality when "[a] communication ... reveals
the contemplation of a crime or harmful act,"' I0 when "the
person was the victim or subject of a crime,""'51 when the social
worker "is a defendant in either a civil or criminal action,'
1 52
or when the social worker is a state employee performing activ-
ities under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet for Human Re-
sources.' 53 Taken together, these exceptions and limitations leave
little of an effective social worker-client privilege.
The sexual assault counselor-victim privilege specifically re-
quires that, to be privileged, the revealed information must be
disclosed in confidence.5 4 Therefore, the failure of the confiden-
tiality of the communication may destroy the privilege.' 5 Excep-
tions to the privilege are also provided when testimony is sought
to establish chain of custody in evidence, 56 in matters of proof
"concerning the physical appearance of the victim at the time
of the injury, 11 7 when the counselor "has knowledge that the
victim has given perjured testimony,"'5 8 or "[tlo any information
11 KRS § 335.170(4). Technically, the language of the exception requires that the
client be informed, before the examination, that any communications made during the
examination would not be privileged. Id.
KRS § 335.170(7).
KRS § 335.170(2).
' KRS § 335.170(3). This exception is limited to proceedings in which "the
commission of such crime is the subject of inquiry," when the social worker is "sub-
poenaed by a court." Id.
KRS § 335.170(5).
KRS § 335.170(6). This exception is limited to circumstances in which the social
worker is performing activities "solely within the confines or under the jurisdiction of
the cabinet." Id. (emphasis added) The meaning of "solely" is unclear. Conceivably,
an activity sponsored by two state agencies might carry with it the obligation of
confidentiality, while the same activity sponsored only by the Cabinet for Human
Resources would not be protected under this section.
KRS § 421.2151(l)(d).
'' The statute requires only that the victim believes the information was "disclosed
in confidence," KRS § 421.2151(l)(d)(1), and the victim believes it will not be disclosed
to others not present or necessary for the counseling. (KRS § 421.2151(l)(d)(l)-(2)).
KRS § 421.2151(3)(a).
KRS § 421.2151(3)(b).
KRS § 421.2151(3)(c). Strangely, this provision requires that, before the excep-
tion to the privilege exists, the defendant or state must have given "notice to the court
that perjury may have been committed." Id.
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revealed by a victim which relates to the identify of the victim's
assailant." 15 9
Ironically, of all the statutory privileges in Kentucky, the
one with the fewest exceptions may be the school counselor
privilege. 16 It requires the counselor to be certified pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statute section 161.030 and "duly appointed
and regularly employed for the purpose of counseling .... ,,161
The only explicit exception to the privilege is that information
may be released with the consent of the student counselee or (if
less than 18 years of age) the student and his or her parent. 162
C. Other Common Exceptions
In addition to the exceptions contained in the statutes estab-
lishing privileges, there are a variety of other exceptions to
privileges. These arise in different ways, including by implication
from other statutory provisions, as well as from the common
law. The extent of the common law exceptions is somewhat
speculative, however, because there are a limited number of
Kentucky decisions and, nationally, the decisions have not been
uniform. Over the years Kentucky courts have* manifested a
dislike for medical and psychotherapy privileges which has re-
sulted in narrowing the privileges and expanding the excep-
tions. 163 Therefore, the Kentucky courts might use many of the
159 KRS § 421.2151(3)(d).
110 KRS § 421.216 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
161 Id.
"I See supra note 41. See generally Smith, Privacy, Dangerousness and Counselors,
15 J. L. & EDUC. 121 (1986).
163 Examples of the tendency of the Kentucky Supreme Court (or the old Court of
Appeals) to narrow privileges are Atwood v. Atwood, 550 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1976)
(holding that in child custody cases the mental health of all individuals involved is in
issue, and therefore no privilege exists regarding communications between parent and
psychiatrist because KRS § 421.215(3)(c) has been satisfied); Williams v. Tarter, 151
S.W.2d 783 (Ky. 1941) (holding that the physician-patient privilege statute relates only
to certain matters set out in the statute's subsections and that common law allows no
privilege otherwise); Boyd v. Winn, 150 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1941) (holding that the
physician-patient privilege statute applies only to transactions coming within the purview
of the Bureau of Vital Statistics as set out in the statute, and the statute does not make
all communications between physician and patients privileged). There is, more recently,
some cause to hope that the courts are more accepting of mental health privileges.
Amburgey v. Central Ky. Regional Mental Health Bd., Inc., 663 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. Ct.
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exceptions discussed in this section to narrow the applicability
of privileges.
1. Child Abuse
There is no medical or psychotherapy privilege for infor-
mation received about child abuse.'6 These privileges are lost
regardless of the source of information about the abuse. 65 For
example, an abuser seeking psychotherapy to help stop being an
abusive parent apparently would not be included in any psychi-
atrist-patient or psychologist-patient privilege, although we note
below a weak argument that the psychologist-patient privilege
might apply in these cases.166 The attorney-client and the minister
privileges may apply in cases of child abuse, but other privileges
apparently do not.' 67
App. 1983) (involving psychiatrist-patient privilege). The court of appeals noted that the
privilege "is absolute in the absence of the legislated and recognized exceptions." Id. at
953; Southern Bluegrass Mental Health & Mental Retardation Bd., Inc. v. Angelucci,
609 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. Ct. App.), aff'd, 609 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1980) (involving psychol-
ogist-patient and psychiatrist- patient privileges).
" ' KRS § 199.335(2),(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). (This section is re-
pealed, effective July 1, 1987. Thereafter substantially the same provision will be con-
tained in KRS §§ 620.050(2), 620.030(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986)).
" Subsection (7) specifically eliminates any privileges other than the attorney-client
and clergy-penitent privileges.
(7) Neither the husband-wife nor any professional-client/patient privilege,
except the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privilege, shall be a ground
for refusing to report under this section or for excluding evidence regarding
an abused or neglected child or the cause thereof, in any judicial proceed-
ings resulting from a report pursuant to this section.
KRS § 199.335(7). (After July 1, 1987, this becomes KRS § 620.050(2).)
Several interesting questions arise from this provision. First, the question arises regard-
ing whether, by implication, the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privileges are effective
in cases of child abuse and neglect. The clear implication is that these two privileges sur-
vive child abuse. The second question is whether this provision exempts attorneys and clergy
from the duty to report. KRS § 199.335(2). The answer to this is far from clear because
the privilege referred to in subsection seven technically does not deal with the issue of report-
ing, only with court proceedings. It appears most likely, however, that the intent was to
exempt these professionals from the obligation to report. A third question is whether
psychologists are privileged, as opposed to being required to report, under this statute. See
infra notes 170-171.
" See infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
KRS § 199.335(7). (After July 1, 1987, this becomes KRS § 620.050(2).)
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Child abuse and neglect are defined very broadly to include
serious physical injury, emotional abuse, sexual exploitation, and
neglect.' 6 These terms, in turn, are undefined or are defined
very broadly. This breadth of definition, as a practical matter,
is of limited importance in considering the application of privi-
leges, but is considerably more important, however, in the ob-
ligation to report abuse, discussed below.'
69
The child abuse statute provides that none of the "profes-
sional-client/patient privileges, except the attorney-client privi-
lege and clergy-penitent privilege, shall be a ground ... for
excluding evidence regarding an abused or neglected child or the
cause thereof. . . .170 However, in the privilege statute psychol-
ogist-patient communications are placed "on the same basis" as
attorney-client communications.' 7 ' An argument can be made
that, as such, the privilege would exempt psychologists to the
same extent attorneys are exempted from obligations to report
and testify under the child abuse reporting statute. The courts,
however, more likely would find that psychologists were not to
be treated as attorneys for the purpose of this statute and that
KRS § 199.011(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) provides:
(6) "Abused or neglected child" means a child whose health or welfare
is harmed or threatened with harm when his parent, guardian or other
person who has the permanent or temporary care, custody or responsibility
for the supervision of the child: inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the
child, physical or mental injury to the child by other than accidental means;
creates or allows to be created a risk of physical or mental injury to the
child by other than accidental means; commits or allows to be committed
an act of sexual abuse upon the child, including sexual exploitation; will-
fully abandons or exploits such child; does not provide the child with
adequate care and supervision; food, clothing and shelter; education; or
medical care necessary for the child's well-being; provided, however, that
a parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby
does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason
alone shall not be considered a negligent parent or guardian. This excep-
tion, however, shall not preclude a court from ordering that medical
services be provided to the child, where his health requires it.
(This provision is repealed effective July 1, 1987. The revised version, KRS §
600.020(1), is very similar to the current statute.)
' See infra notes 228-251 and accompanying text.
170 KRS § 199.335(7). (After July 1, 1987 KRS § 620.050(2).)
171 KRS § 319.111 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) provides that "confidential
relations and communications" between psychologist and patients "are placed on the
same basis as those provided by the law between attorney and client ......
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the legislature meant to exclude the psychologist-patient privilege
under the terms of the statute.
72
2. Adult Abuse
Child abuse statutes have been models for efforts to reduce
abuse against other groups. Kentucky has adopted a statute
requiring the reporting of adult abuse and neglect. 7 3 This statute
essentially applies to any abused person who is unable to protect
himself or herself from neglect or hazardous situations. The
statute specifically provides that "[n]either the psychologist-pa-
tient privilege nor the husband-wife privilege shall be a ground
for excluding evidence regarding the abuse, neglect, or exploi-
tation of an adult. ... "74 It is interesting that medical and
therapy privileges other than the psychologist-patient privilege
are not specifically mentioned in the statute. A strict reading of
the statute would permit privileges other than the psychologist-
patient privilege to apply in the case of adult abuse. For example,
the physician-patient privilege, 75 the psychiatrist-patient privilege
and the counselor-student privilege may not be excepted by this
language. (The social worker privilege has an explicit exception
that would seem to prevent it from qualifying.) Courts, however,
likely would read the reference to the psychologist-patient privi-
lege in the adult abuse statute as applying generally to all psy-
chotherapy and medical privileges. As with the child abuse statute,
I, The Kentucky General Assembly undoubtedly intended to include psychologists
among those required to report and testify concerning child abuse. KRS § 199.335(2)
specifies that "mental health professionals" are required to report. After July 1, 1987, this
provision becomes KRS § 620.030(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). For the defini-
tion of abuse or neglect, see KRS § 209.020(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982).
:' KRS § 209.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) provides:
(2) Any person, including, but not limited to, physician, law enforce-
ment officer, nurse, social worker, department personnel, coroner, medical
examiner, alternate care facility employed [sic], or caretaker, having rea-
sonable cause to suspect that an adult has suffered abuse, neglect, or
exploitation, shall report or cause reports to be made in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter. Death of the adult does not relieve one of
the responsibility for reporting the circumstances surrounding the death.
KRS § 209.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982).
'7 The physician-patient privilege would not be important because the physician-
patient privilege was essentially destroyed some time ago.
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the loss of privileges here probably is not as important as the
obligation to report abuse. This issue is discussed in the next
section.
3. Child Custody
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Atwood v. Atwood,
76
found an implicit exception to the psychiatrist-patient privilege
(and presumably other psychotherapy privileges) for child cus-
tody cases by holding that the privilege did not preclude deposing
psychiatrists with whom the mother had consulted. 177 This ex-
ception apparently arises out of the importance of the mental
health of the parents in making custody decisions, the fact that
those seeking custody of children put their mental conditions
into issue, and the fact that child custody statutes (passed after
the psychiatrist-patient privilege statute) "place the mental con-
ditions of all family members squarely in issue.' ' 78 Atwood
seems particularly inconsistent with the statute creating the psy-
chiatrist-patient privilege which appears to limit this kind of an
exception to those situations where the patient was informed
that the communications would not be privileged and the patient
made the communications in the course of a psychiatric exami-
nation order by the court. 1
79
Atwood suggests the continuation of judicial distaste for
medical and psychological privileges which was manifested in
the Court of Appeal's treatment of the medical privilege before
World War 11.180
4. Dangerous Patients
Increasingly, no medical privilege appears to exist when a
mental health professional or physician has determined that a
patient poses a serious risk to others. This "dangerous patient
exception" to privileges may arise from several sources. The
"7 550 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1976).
'"Id. See Guernsey, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Child Placement: A
Relevancy Analysis, 26 ViLL. L. REv. 955 (1980-81).
,78 550 S.W. 2d at 467.
.79 KRS § 421.215(3)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-MerrilI 1972).
"I See also Allen v. Dept. Human Resources, 540 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1976).
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psychiatrist-patient privilege, as this Article has noted, does not
apply when the patient is in need of hospitalization or civil
commitment, 8' nor does the social worker privilege apply when
there is contemplation of a harmful act. 82 The psychologist-
patient privilege and physician-patient privilege apparently adopt
the exceptions inherent in the attorney-client privilege1 83 and,
therefore, discussion of future crimes (violence) probably will
not be included within the privilege. Finally, the Tarasoffl84 duty
to warn, described following, undoubtedly would destroy any
privilege. 8 -
The limitation on the privilege is not necessarily limited to
situations in which the patient is threatening a dangerous crime.
The social worker privilege, for example, provides for an excep-
tion for communication "that reveals the contemplation of a
crime or a harmful act," thereby suggesting non-harmful crimes
may be included in a future crime exception to that privilege.
86
The dependence on the attorney-client privilege by the psycho-
therapist-patient and physician-patient prvileges may include a
future crime exception that extends beyond violent acts. 87 Thus,
the disclosure of future crimes, not an uncommon occurrence
by some psychotherapy patients, may be outside these privileges.
5. Patient Waiver
Competent patients may consent to the disclosure of infor-
mation from treatment or therapy.' 88 Because the privilege be-
longs to the patient and not to physicians and therapists, patients
voluntarily may waive the privilege without the agreement of the
physician or psychotherapist. The waiver of a privilege essentially
destroys that privilege, at least for the information released
pursuant to the waiver; the information released is no longer
confidential.
", KRS § 421.215(3)(a).
,12 KRS § 335.170(2) (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU Supp. 1986).
'"' KRS §§ 213.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982), 319.111 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1986).
' Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
The "duty to warn" is discussed infra, at notes 258-289 and accompanying text.
'' KRS § 335.170(2).
" KRS §§ 213.200, 319.111.
' See infra note 191.
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Although professionals cannot refuse to release information
when a privilege of confidentiality has been waived by a com-
petent patient, they can inform the patient of the consequences
of releasing such information. The codes of ethics increasingly
recognize some affirmative responsibility to inform patients of
the consequences of releasing certain information. For example,
the American Psychiatric Association provides "[t]he continuing
duty of the psychiatrist to protect the patient includes fully
apprising him/her of the connotations of waiving the privilege
of privacy."1 89 The American Psychological Association requires
that "[w]here appropriate, psychologists inform their clients of
the legal limits of confidentiality." 190
Some privileges in Kentucky specifically recognize the con-
sent to release information. 19' Even without an express waiver
provision, however, patients should have the right to explicitly
waive privileges. As this Article later discusses, patients may also
implicitly waive a privilege by disclosing the information other-
wise protected by the privilege or by bringing their health or
mental states into issue in legal proceedings.
6. Patient/Litigant Exception
Patients who bring their health or mental states into question
in litigation waive any privileges concerning relevant information
from treatment or therapy. 92 This exception is based on the
unfairness of allowing a person to raise questions about health
or mental conditions and then to use the privilege to prevent
opposing parties from obtaining information with which to chal-
lenge the claims. The patient/litigant exception, however, means
that a patient may face the unhappy choice of abandoning either
IS AMmucAN PsYcmATRic AssocLunoN, supra note 16, at Section 4-2 (emphasis
added).
110 AMERIcAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCLATION, supra note 15, at Principle 5 (emphasis
added).
"I Examples of statutes that specifically recognize consent to release information
are KRS § 335.170 (Supp. 1986) (social worker privilege); KRS § 421.2151 (Supp. 1986)
(sexual assault counselor); and KRS § 421.216 (Supp. 1986) (school counselor privilege).
"I Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 954 (1977) (holding plaintiff who sues for mental and emotional injuries clearly
puts mental condition in issue and therefore waives any psychotherapist-patient privilege).
See Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Ky. 1986).
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a valid claim (or defense) or the confidentiality of therapy. 193
This patient/litigant exception is universally accepted as a part
of statutory, common law, or constitutional privileges.
194
Too often the patient/litigant exception becomes a serious
infringement on the privacy of treatment or therapy. Having
raised some issue regarding health, the patient may find his or
her entire physical or mental health history subject to discovery.
Courts could narrow intrusions into the confidences of treatment
and therapy by limiting this exception to conditions that are
directly relevant to the lawsuit and by examining questionable
evidence in camera to determine if its introduction will do more
harm than good. 95 Especially in the area of mental health in-
formation, courts should be reluctant to permit broad discovery
unless there is some reason to expect that the information is
relevant. For example, claims of emotional distress or suffering
should not be the basis for an unlimited discovery of the pa-
tient's previous mental health condition. 96 Unfortunately, courts
have been slow to provide protection for the confidences of
psychotherapy when the patient/litigant exception is invoked. As
a result, the exception too often has been an excuse for opposing
counsel to conduct a thorough fishing expedition into the mental
and emotional history of a patient. 97
I The ease with which the privilege can be lost is illustrated by Allen v. Dept.
Human Resources, 540 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1976) in which in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights a mother stated that "she has been under the care of a psychiatrist but
is nevertheless able to provide for her children." The court held that this was sufficient
to "have introduced [her] mental dondition as an element of [her] claim" and therefore
to have waived the psychiatrist-patient privilege. Id. at 598-99.
" See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976); In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557 (Cal.
1970).
1- Judge Hufstedler has proposed that, to avoid unnecessary invasion of the con-
fidences of therapy, the patient-litigant exception should ordinarily be limited to ascer-
taining the time, length, cost, and ultimate diagnosis of treatment. An adverse party
would be permitted to demand additional information concerning therapy only if the
party demonstrated a compelling need for the information. 542 F.2d at 1074-75 (Huf-
stedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
467 P.2d at 567.
Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture of Misguided
Hope, 23 CAnt. U.L. REv. 649 (1974).
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7. Criminal Defense Exception
To present an adequate defense to criminal charges, a
defendant may require information revealed by another in ther-
apy. A defendant, for example, might wish to present evidence
of an adverse witness' statements to a therapist which were
inconsistent with the witness' courtroom testimony, but a privi-
lege may restrict the ability to obtain or present this evidence.
The United States Supreme Court, in Davis v. Alaska,193 sug-
gested that a state ban on the use of juvenile records in court
was unconstitutional when those records were crucial to the
defense of a criminal case. 199 Although the actual holding in
Davis was relatively narrow, it has prompted some courts to
hold that the constitutional rights of criminal defendants compel
the disclosure of evidence which is protected by privileges.200 At
the present time, however, such rights are not well defined and
seem to be rather limited.
In the case of sexual assault counselor-victim privilege there
is a limited criminal defense exception when the victim has given
perjured testimony. 201 This exception also extends to any infor-
mation a victim reveals relating to his assailant's identity.20 2
Whether criminal defense exceptions would be recognized in
other privileges is not certain.
8. Requirements for the Privilege
A number of exceptions to the protections of confidentiality
arise because of requirements that must be met for a privilege
to be effective. Whether or not explicitly stated, almost all
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
," Id. AuToR's NoTE: See recent case Penn v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987).
Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66, 79 (Alaska 1976) (holding marital privilege does
not preclude cross-examination of wife regarding incriminating statements made by
husband when he is not a defendant in a criminal trial, but a witness for the prosecution);
State v. Hembd, 232 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Minn. 1975) (holding medical records of plaintiff
are not privileged when necessary to insure defendant's constitutional right to confront
a witness); State v. Roma, 357 A.2d 45, 51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) aff'd on
reargument, 363 A.2d 923 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding marriage counselor
privilege yields to defendant's constitutional right to present an adequate defense).
KRS § 421.2151(3)(c).
KRS § 421.2151(3)(d).
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privileges will be effective only if the following criteria are met:
1. The communications must be to a licensed or certified
professional, as described by the statute, or to an assistant of
the professional. Thus, communication to someone not licensed
or qualified as a professional (within the meaning of the privi-
lege) is not privileged.
203
2. A professional relationship must exist between the patient
or client and the professional. An informal conversation not within
the professional relationship is not protected.
3. The communication must be related to the provision of
professional services.
4. The communication must be confidential. This usually
means that the communication may not be released to third
parties. In addition, the communication must be made with an
expectation of confidentiality.
The privilege requirement most likely to cause difficulty is
that the communication be confidential and made with the ex-
pectation that it will remain confidential. This has implications
for court-ordered examinations, group therapy, students and
assistants, and the release of information to third-party payers such
as insurance companies.
9. Court-Ordered Examinations
Examinations made for courts or for litigation cannot be
made with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality because
the subject should understand that the information from the
interview will be transmitted to others. For example, an exami-
nation as part of the civil commitment process will be reported
in court, and an examination in a civil case to assess disability
will be revealed to the opposing party and perhaps revealed in
court. A state is not constitutionally required to inform a patient
:" In some instances, a reasonable belief that someone is qualified as a covered
professional is sufficient to protect the communication. The Federal Rules of Evidence
proposed by the Supreme Court, for example, provided that the patient's belief that a
psychotherapist qualified for the privilege was sufficient to establish the privilege. Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 504, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1973).
The Kentucky psychiatrist-patient privilege contains a similar provision. KRS §
421.215(l)(b).
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of Miranda2°4 rights as part of most examinations, even if the
examination might lead to involuntary civil commitment or in-
carceration as part of a sexual psychopath law.20 5 Therefore,
patients being interviewed by a physician or mental health
professional may not know of the special limits on confidential-
ity. The Kentucky psychiatrist-patient privilege appears to limit
the use of information from court-ordered examinations to cir-
cumstances in which the patient is informed that the communi-
cations are not privileged. 206 The Kentucky Supreme Court,
however, at least has implied that other exceptions expand the
circumstances in which such testimony could be used.2 7 Despite
this uncertainty about the psychiatrist-patient privilege, any ex-
amination ordered by a court or done with the expectation that
it will be used in court probably is not included in a privilege.203
Perhaps those civilly committed should have particularly
strong protection of their confidences. As involuntary patients
they have little choice except to undergo therapy. Therefore,
society may have an obligation to minimize the invasion of these
involuntary patients' privacy interests by providing strong pro-
tection for confidentiality. The psychiatrist-patient privilege is
therefore especially unfortunate in limiting the privilege for pa-
tients who are civilly committed.
10. Group Therapy
Group therapy involves a number of patients who, although
they may be active to varying degrees in each other's therapy,
are present primarily for the diagnosis and treatment of their
own conditions. 209 By definition, third parties are present during
group psychotherapy. Thus, group therapy poses special prob-
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
101 Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2995 (1986) (regarding commitment subject to
sexual psychopath laws); French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (M.D.N.C.
1977), summarily aff'd, 433 U.S. 901 (1979) (regarding involuntary civil commitment
procedures).
KRS § 421.215(3)(b).
1 Atwood v. Atwood, 550 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Ky. 1976). But see Amburgey v.
Central Kentucky Regional Mental Health Rd., 663 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. 1983).
211 See Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 427 (1986).
Meyer & Smith, A Crisis in Group Therapy, 32 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 638 (1977).
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lems in determining the existence of privileges. A close analysis
of traditional rules concerning the presence of third parties sug-
gests that communications revealed in group therapy are not
privileged.21 The third parties are not assistants of the therapist,
they are present for their own therapy. Furthermore, to the
extent the conversation is between the group members rather
than between a group member and the therapist, the communi-
cation may be between patients rather then between professional
and patient.
The Kentucky psychiatrist-patient privilege attempts to deal
with this problem by providing that the privilege applies to
communications "between patient and the psychiatrist, or be-
tween members of the patient's family and psychiatrist, or be-
tween any of the foregoing and such persons who participate,
under the supervision of the psychiatrist, in the accomplishment
of the objectives of diagnosis or treatment. 211 A court reason-
ably could interpret this language as applying to group therapy.
A court, however, possibly could find this language to require
that "the such persons who participate" be participating for the
purpose of accomplishing the objectives of diagnosis or treat-
ment of the patient claiming the privilege. In fact group members
are participating for the objective of the diagnosis or treatment
of their own conditions. Furthermore, a court could hold that
the language applies only when there is a clear expectation of
privacy, which may not always be present during group therapy.
Whatever the uncertainties of group therapy coverage under
the psychiatrist-patient privilege, the coverage is greater than
under the other privileges which do not contain even implicit
reference to group therapy. The better position is to include
2p, Id. See generally Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in
Group Psychotherapy, 1970 L. & Soc. ORDER 191, 193-94; Morgan, Must the Group
Get Up and Testify? An Evamination of Group Therapy Privilege, 2 GROUP 67, 70-73
(1978); Note, Group Therapy and Privileged Communication, 43 IND. L.J. 93, 98-100
(1967). For discussions of the effect of third parties on the applicability of the attorney-
client privilege, see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Multiple Party Situations, 8
CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 179 (1972); Note, Legal Professional Privilege and Third
Parties, 37 MOD. L. Rav. 601 (1974); Note, Evidence-Privileged Communication in
Divorce Actions: Psychiatrist-Patient and Presence of Third Parties, 40 TENN. L. Rv.
110 (1972).
21, KRS § 421.215(2).
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group therapy within the privilege, at least when there is a clear
understanding that each of the group members is to maintain
silence about the confidences revealed.212 This expectation of
privacy could be bolstered, as later discussed, if a cause of action
existed against group member who violated this expectation of
confidentiality.
213
11. Students and Assistants
Those who are necessary or useful in assisting the profes-
sional with the provision of services usually are not considered
to be third parties who destroy the confidentiality of informa-
tion. Therefore, nurses, records and office assistants, and the
like are within the privileges to the extent they are directly under
the supervision of, and assisting, the professional who is covered
by a privilege. At some point, however, the assistants become
so independent that the assistants are no longer included within
the privilege. Where this point occurs in medical treatment and
psychotherapy is not adequately defined in Kentucky. For ex-
ample, it is unclear whether a professional (such as physician's
assistant or social worker) who is working under broad practice
protocol is covered by the privilege. The privilege probably is
lost when the supervision of the treatment of a patient is some-
what indirect and performed entirely by a secondary or para-
professional.
The same principles apply to treatment by those in training,
but not yet licensed. A psychology student taking a practicum
course or an internship would be covered by the privilege only
to the extent that the student is seeing patients as an assistant
to a covered professional. Again, the line-drawing here is par-
ticularly difficult. In a recent Georgia case, a lower court sug-
gested that patients seen by a student were not included within
212 This position was persuasively taken in State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 133-
34 (Minn. 1984).
"I The final section of this Article argues for the concept of extended confidentiality
in which some of those receiving confidential information have a legal obligation to
maintain those secrets.
[Vol. 75
PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIALITY
the psychotherapist-patient relationship covered by a privilege,2 1 4
but the status of those in training is far from certain.
12. Third-Party Payers
A considerable portion of medical treatment, and to a lesser
degree psychotherapy, is covered by third-party payers such as
private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or a variety of other
government programs. These third-party payers require the re-
lease of varying amounts of information from medical treatment
or psychotherapy as a condition of payment for the services.
The patient ordinarily must consent to the release of this infor-
mation, and the refusal of consent means that the third-party
payer will not cover the services or that the patient is in breach
of the contract of insurance. Having given the information to
the third-party payer, a patient voluntarily has disclosed infor-
mation from therapy and thereby may have lost the protection
of a privilege covering that information, and potentially other
information from therapy.215 Thus, the otherwise privileged in-
formation, if released to an insurance company or other third-
party payer, may no longer be considered privileged.
21 6
13. Privileges After Death
Medical and psychotherapy privileges may die with their
holders. In theory, at least, the release of very private infor-
,14 See Hall v. State, 336 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. 1985) in which the Georgia Supreme
Court noted that an appellate court had refused to apply the psychologist-patient privilege
to a student in training (the Georgia Supreme Court did not decide the issue). Students
should be considered assistants of a therapist (faculty supervisor) under whose direction
the evaluation or therapy is undertaken. Recently, however, some question has been
raised about this principle. In People v. Gomez, 185 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 n.3 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) the court held that family court interns were not covered by the privilege
unless they were working under the supervision of a therapist to whom the privilege
attached.
2" Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: Are Patients Victims in the Inves-
tigation of Medicaid Fraud?, 19 IND. L. Rnv. 831 (1986).
21, See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983)
(holding patients who have disclosed their names to an insurance company have waived
their privilege); In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding patient waived
privilege when authorized disclosure of records to medical insurance carrier for reim-
bursement).
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mation following death does considerably less harm than its
release before death and, therefore, there is no sufficient reason
to withhold relevant information from courts. In Kentucky, only
the psychiatrist-patient privilege specifically speaks to this issue,
and then only as it relates to the patient/litigant exception when
the patient's condition "is introduced by any party claiming or
defending through or as a beneficiary of the patient" and the
judge finds that such release would be appropriate. 217 Wigmore
had argued for a death limitation on the exercise of privileges
and Kentucky courts probably would be inclined to follow this
in the medical and psychotherapy areas.
21 8
D. Federal Cases and State Privileges
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly provide for
a physician-patient or any other psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege. The United States Supreme Court proposed federal rules
which enumerated several specific privileges including a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, but not including a physician-patient
privilege. 2 9 Rule 504 of the proposed rules was based on the
assumption that an assurance of confidentiality is essential to
effective psychotherapy, but not essential to most medical care."2 0
Congress, however, rejected the Supreme Court's specific pro-
posals because of a complicated debate over which privileges
should be adopted and whether privileges are a matter of sub-
stantive or procedural law. 22' Congress chose instead to replace
all of the enumerated privileges with one general rule, Rule 501,
governing all privileges. m
2,7 KRS § 421.215(3)(c).
2,8 \VI oOR, supra note 2, at § 2387. See Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
Rule 504(d)(3), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1973).
219 Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 504, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-
41 (1973),
Id. at 241-42.
221 See 10 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE q 500.01, at 1 (2d ed. 1979); Friedenthal,
The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 673, 682-85 (1975); Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84
YALE L.J. 9, 22-27 (1974); Schwartz, Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence-
A Step Forward?, 38 U. PrrT L. Rv. 79, 81 (1976).
FED. R. EvnD. 501.
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Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for
different rules of evidence depending on whether a case is based
on state law (diversity case) or federal law ("federal" case).,23
In cases "as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege... shall be determined in accordance with State law.
' '
2
4
In federal cases, to which federal law applies, privileges are
governed "by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience.' '22 In other words, in federal courts,
state law regarding privileges governs in diversity cases, and
federal law regarding privileges governs in federal question cases.
Therefore, even in states with strong privileges, federal cases in
federal courts may not have any medical or psychotherapy priv-
ileges at all.
The Sixth Circuit, as noted earlier, has adopted a limited
psychotherapist-patient privilege as a matter of federal common
law. 226 Kentucky, therefore, is one of the states in which a limited
federal common law psychotherapist-patient privilege applies in
federal cases. The full dimensions of the Sixth Circuit's common
law privilege are not known, although the decision establishing the
privilege suggested it may be quite narrow.227 Depending on the
course of future decisions, ironically, the federal common law
privilege for psychotherapy may actually exceed the protections pro-
vided by statute in Kentucky.
E. To Whom Does the Privilege Apply?
A major purpose of privileges is to assure patients that they
can be open in therapy and that their confidences will not be
revealed as part of litigation. If privileges are to accomplish this
purpose, some level of certainty in the application of privileges
is essential. Limitations should be narrow and clear. With this
221 Id.
-4 Id. See Comment, supra note 2.
21- FED. R. EvwD. 501.
I!' See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 636, 639 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983).
227 Id. at 639-40. "Mhe appropriate scope of a privilege... is determined by balancing
the interests protected by shielding the evidence sought with those advanced by disclosure."
Id.
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in mind, imagine what a patient entering medical care or psy-
chotherapy should be told if he or she asks whether revealed
information may be subject to disclosure in court. If the patient
is seeking medical treatment he or she will have to be told that
there probably will be little or no protection and that informa-
tion revealed may be released in court.
If the patient asks a psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker,
pastoral counselor, or school counselor about a privilege, the
answer will vary from professional to professional, but broadly
he or she will be told the following: "The protection your
information from therapy will have depends first on where the
case arises. If it arises in a federal case in the Sixth Circuit there
will be at least some possibility that it will not have to be
disclosed; if it arises in a federal case in most of the rest of the
country it is likely that there will be no protection and that all
the information will have to be disclosed to the extent it is
relevant. If your information is relevant in a case in a Kentucky
court (or diversity case in a federal court) the information you
reveal in therapy will probably be protected unless you agreed
to the release of the information, you reveal information about
child abuse or adult abuse, you threaten serious harm to others,
you are in need of hospitalization, you become embroiled in a
child custody case, you bring your own mental condition into
court in any kind of a case, you are treated by someone other
than a covered professional, (perhaps) your information becomes
essential for someone else's defense to a criminal act, you release
the information to an insurance company or other third-party
payer, you become involved in group therapy (that information
might not be covered by the privilege), or you die."
Having heard all of this, the patient might conclude that lie
or she does not have much assurance that revealed information
will be protected by Kentucky's statutory privileges. Should the
patient ask about protection of confidentiality outside of court,
he or she might be distressed further.
IV. REMOVING EVEN MORE: LIMITS ON CONIDENTIALITY
The patient probably understands that a variety of legal
doctrines protect confidentiality and that, therefore, he or she
need not seriously worry about confidentiality unless embroiled
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in a lawsuit. What the patient may not understand are the limits
to these protections. Limitations on the confidentiality of med-
ical care and psychotherapy arise from statutory exceptions to
confidentiality (required disclosure); special relationships be-
tween therapist, patients, and others; the review of care given
by health care providers; and methods of financing health care.
This Article considers these as they affect confidentiality.
A. Privileges
In the absence of effective privileges, one interference with
confidentiality, as discussed, is government required disclosure
of medical and psychotherapy information. Some exceptions
apply even if the patient himself never becomes involved in a
lawsuit. For example, patients' files may be used or reviewed by
a third-party payer or the government to prove a physician's in-
surance or Medicare fraud. Thus the absence of strong, effective
privileges is the first, significant threat to confidentiality.
B. Child Abuse
Current statutes require that anyone (specifically including
most medical personnel) knowing of or suspecting child abuse
report that abuse to state authorities (child protective services
agencies). 228 The commendable purpose of these statutes is to
reduce violence against children by permitting early intervention
by state authorities. In practice, however, poorly written and
KRS § 199.335(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) provides:
(2) Any physician, osteopathic physician, nurse, teacher, school per-
sonnel, social worker, coroner, medical examiner, child caring personnel,
resident, intern, chiropractor, dentist, optometrist, health professional,
peace officer, mental health professional or other person who knows or
has reasonable cause to believe that a child is an abused or neglected child,
shall report or cause a report to be made in accordance with the provisions
of this section. When any of the above specified persons is attending a
child as part of his professional duties, he shall report or cause a report
to be made in accordance with the provisions of this section. Nothing in
this section is intended to relieve individuals, agencies or organizations of
their obligation to report.
On July 1, 1987, this section is repealed and is replaced by KRS § 620.030(1), (2),
which contains language similar to KRS § 199.335(2),(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1986).
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very broad abuse reporting statutes may interfere with therapy
and in some cases even be counterproductive.2 9 This affirmative
obligation to report child abuse is of more practical importance,
in terms of its effect on confidentiality, than the loss of privileges
under these statutes. The abuse reporting statutes require that
physicians and psychotherapists take affirmative action to breach
the confidences of therapy.2 0
Mandatory child abuse reporting statutes are relatively new
and have been the subject of many changes during their short
history. For some time, physicians have had a duty to report
certain conditions, most notably serious communicable diseases,
primarily to protect third parties (the community) from the
patient. In 1963, the United States Children's Bureau proposed
"legislation on reporting of the physically abused child."' z Re-
porting laws were adopted at a rapid rate and within four years
all 50 states had them.232 Kentucky now has a very broad child
abuse reporting statute which requires that anyone knowing or
having reason to believe that child abuse has occured report such
to a protective services agency.23 3 Virtually all medical personnel
and those involved in delivering psychotherapy have a specific
obligation to report known or suspected child abuse, whatever
the source of information. This obligation arises when physicians
or nurses see evidence of abuse while treating a child for physical
injuries or when psychiatrists, psychologists, and counselors see
emotional abuse while treating a child, or when an abusive
parent seeks therapy to stop the abuse.
Child abuse is defined very broadly to include serious phys-
ical injury, emotional injury, sexual exploitation, and neglect.
4
See Newberger, The Helping Hand Strikes Again: Unintended Consequences of
Child Abuse Reporting, 12 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 307 (1983).
-0 KRS § 199.335(2).
21, U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THE ABUSED CHILD-PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED
LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING ON THE PnYsIcALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963). THE
MEDICAL COMIUNITY COUNTERED WITH ITS OWN PROPOSED MODEL ACT. See American
Medical Association, Physical Abuse of Children-Suggested Legislation (1965).
232 Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Di-
rections, 17 FAm. L.Q. 151, 153-54 (1984). See Fraser, A Glimpse at the Future: A
Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 Cm.-K Nr
L. REv. 641, 650-67 (1977-78).
-3 KRS § 199.335.
KRS § 199.011(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). The definition of abuse
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These terms, however, are essentially left undefined.2Y5 It is
difficult, therefore, for those obligated to report to know with
certainty what events must be reported. This uncertainty natu-
rally has lead to confusion about what constitutes child abuse
and neglect and undoubtedly adversely affects the ability of
authorities to discover and successfully deal with abuse.
The National Study of Child Abuse found that nearly 6070
of the cases reported to child protection agencies as suspected
child abuse could not be substantiated.236 The problem of over-
reporting is significant; recent estimates are that this year as
many as 1.8 million children will be reported as abused .37 Iron-
ically, the uncertainty concerning the definitions may also con-
tribute to significant underreporting. The National Study found
that 6807 of the children thought to be within the scope of abuse
and neglect were not known to the child protection agency.238 In
fact, only 2107o of the cases known to those outside the child
protection agencies were reported to those agencies. 239 If any-
is set out supra note 168. See J. GIovANNONi & R. BECERRA, DEFINNG CHILD ABUSE 4-
13, 257-59 (1979).
z. Sexual exploitation, however, is defined in some detail. KRS § 199.011(16).
(16) "Sexual exploitation" includes but is not limited to a situation
in which a parent, guardian or other person having custodial control or
supervision of a child or responsible for his welfare, allows, permits, or
encourages the child to engage in an act which constitutes prostitution
under Kentucky law; or a parent, guardian or other person having custodial
control or supervision of a child or responsible for his welfare, allows,
permits, or encourages the child to engage in an act of obscene or por-
nographic photographing, filming, or depicting of a child as provided for
under Kentucky law.
On July 1, 1987, this section becomes KRS § 600.020(36).
On July 1, 1987, several other important terms will also be defined. These defini-
tions, however, are not very useful. For example, "physical injury" means "substantial
physical pain or any impairment of physical condition." KRS § 600.020(27) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
-" U.S. CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE
AND SEVERITY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1981) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY OF
CHiLD ABUSE]. The NATIONAL STUDY estimated that 1.1 million children were reported
as abused or neglected each year, and more than 600,000 of these could not be substan-
tiated even using fairly broad definitions of abuse and neglect.
-11 A later report suggests that by 1983 the annual number of children reported as
abused or neglected has risen to 1.5 million. D. WmTcoN1a, E. SHAPiRo & L. STELL-
WAGEN, When the Victim is a Child 2 (1985). With continued increases it is not
unreasonable to expect that by now the figure is closer to 1.8 million.
2 NATIONAL STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 236.
z' Id.
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thing, the actual rate of reporting nationwide may be lower than
indicated by that study. A significant price is paid for the
confusion about what is required to be reported.241 Abuse that
is not dealt with may result in serious harm to the child, and
false reports (even if made in good faith) may disrupt families,
invade privacy, and make some relationships more difficult to
maintain.2
2
Statutes contain some incentive for overreporting because the
failure to report known or suspected child abuse or neglect may
result in criminal or civil liability or professional discipline. 24
3
Although Kentucky, unlike some states, does not provide sta-
tutorily that a child who is injured after someone's failure to
make the required report has a civil claim against that person,
such liability is possible. The liability might be based on a form
of negligence per se,244 on the basis of ordinary malpractice
negligence, 245 or on the Tarasoffl2 statutory liabilities discussed
24 The definition used by the NATIONAL STUDY has been criticized by some, partic-
ularly as it relates to the definition of sexual abuse and the requirement that the abuser
be a parent or other caretaker. FinkeIhor & Hotaling, Sexual Abuse in the National
Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect: An Appraisal, 8 CHiLD ABuSE & NEGLECT
23 (1984).
241 See generally J. GiovANNOi & R. BECERRA, supra note 166, at 3-4; Bourne &
Newberger, "Family Autonomy" or "Coercive Intervention?" Ambiguity and Conflict
in the Proposed Standards for Child Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U.L. REv. 670 (1977);
Swoboda, Elwork, Sales & Levine, Knowledge of and Compliance With Privileged
Communication and Child Abuse Reporting Laws, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAc.
448 (1978).
22 Child rearing or family integrity are part of the constitutionally protected right
of autonomy privacy. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925). The constitutional issues raised by state intervention to protect children are
discussed in Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Scope of State Child Neglect
Statutes, 79 CoLtum. L. Rav. 719 (1979).
243 KRS § 199.990(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982). Failure to report is a Class B
misdemeanor. Id.
244 The failure to adhere to a duty described in a criminal, or similar, statute may
result in negligence per se liability if the statute was designed to protect the class of
persons of which the plaintiff is a member and against the risk of harm and injury
which occurred. W.P. KEETON, D. COBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS, 229-31 (W.D. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
141 Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976); Brown & Truitt, Civil Liability
in Child Abuse Cases, 54 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 753, 758-64 (1977-78). For a discussion of
the negligence liability of the failure to report child abuse, see Besharov, Child Abuse
and Neglect: Liability for Failing to Report, 22 TRIL Aug. 1986, at 67; Issacson, Child
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following. 247 In addition, the failure to meet the reporting obli-
gations could result in professional discipline. 24 On the other
hand, inaccurate reporting, if done in good faith, is protected
from criminal and civil liability. 249 Therefore, penalties exist for
underreporting but not for overreporting, evidencing some bias
in favor of overreporting.
One danger of abuse reporting statutes is that abusers who
wish to stop the abuse might be driven from psychotherapy. If
abusers seek therapy and admit to the abuse, they must be
reported to a state agency and their statement (confession) might
be used against them if they are criminally charged. To reduce
the problems with child abuse reporting laws, the definition of
abuse and neglect should be narrowed and sharpened through
more precise definitions. The statutes should be modified to
eliminate the reporting requirement when abusers voluntarily
seek psychotherapy. The therapist should be obligated to report
child abuse when there is the threat of serious, permanent,
physical harm to the child or when therapy is not continuing
and the threat of child abuse may continue. Psychotherapist-
patient privileges, however, should not be abrogated when the
abuser reveals information intended to help stop the abuse. 210
Abuse Reporting Statutes: The Case for Holding Physicians Civilly Liable for Failure
to Report, 12 SAN DEEco L. REv. 743 (1974-75); Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws:
The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 34-36 (1967); Note, Physicians'
Liability for Failure to Diagnose and Report Child Abuse, 23 vAYNE L. REv. 1187
(1977). See also Note, Civil Liability for Teachers' Negligent Failure to Report Suspected
Child Abuse, 28 WAINE L. REV. 183 (1981-82).
'' Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
-' See infra notes 258-289 and accompanying text.
"I Disciplinary action may be taken against psychologists for violating statutes
(including misdemeanors) related to the practice of psychology. KRS § 319.082(f),(m)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). Physicians can be disciplined for conduct that would
be "malpractice," or for failure to conform to prevailing standards of medical practice.
KRS § 311.597(3),(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983). Either of these statutes easily could
be interpreted to permit discipline for criminal failure to report abuse.
-1 KRS § 199.335(6). "Anyone acting upon reasonable cause in the making of a
report ... shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise
be incurred or imposed." Id.
"I Regarding these reforms generally, see Besharov, "Doing Something" About
Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARv. J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 539 (1985); Hurley, Duties in Conflict: Must Psychotherapists Report Child
Abuse Inflicted by Clients and Confided in Therapy, 22 SAN DmEo L. REv. 645 (1985);
Note, Vanishing Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Child Abuse
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Abusers also might be encouraged to seek therapy if limited
immunity from prosecution were provided for abusers who vol-
untarily seek psychotherapy. The immunity would not apply,
however, if therapy were entered into in contemplation of pros-
ecution or if death or serious, permanent, physical harm resulted
from the abuse, or if the abuse continued after therapy began.25
C. Adult Abuse
Medical and mental health workers and others also are re-
quired to report adult abuse and neglect. 252 Adult abuse applies
to spouse abuse, elder abuse, and the abuse of others unable to
protect themselves from neglect or hazardous situations.23
The adult abuse law generally is based on child abuse re-
porting laws and most of the comments made about the child
abuse laws apply to the adult abuse reporting statute.2 4 There
is an affirmative obligation to report abuse or neglect and the
failure to do so may lead to criminal liability,2 5 and perhaps to
civil liability or licensure discipline.
2 56
Reporting Act, 16 PAC. L.J. 335 (1984-85).
Some courts have begun to protect psychotherapist privileges in child abuse cases.
State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 133-34 (Minn. 1984); Missouri ex rel. D.M. v.
Hoester, No. 47744 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1983), reported in 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DisABmrry L. REP. 121-22 (1984). See generally Saltzman, supra note 46.
21 This proposal is described in greater detail in Smith & Meyer, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws and Psychotherapy: A Time for Reconsideration, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSY-
CHIATRY 351 (1985). See Coleman, Creating Therapist-Offender Exception to Mandatory
Child Abuse Reporting Statutes- When Psychiatrist Knows Best, 54 CQn. L. REv. 1113
(1986).
22 KRS § 209.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982). See supra note 173.
211 KRS § 209.020(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) provides:
(4) "Adult" means a person eighteen (18) years of age or older or a
married person without regard to age, who because of mental or physical
dysfunctioning, or who is the victim of abuse or neglect inflicted by a
spouse, is unable to manage his own resources, carry out the activities of
daily living, or protect himself from neglect, hazardous or abusive situa-
tions without assistance from others and ... may be in need of protective
services.
21 See Note, Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse: A Cheap But Ineffective
Solution to the Problem, 14 FORDHAm Un. L.J. 723 (1986).
-1 KRS § 209.990(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
06 See supra notes 244-247 and accompanying text.
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D. Warnings Regarding Dangerous Patients
Both child and adult abuse reporting laws recently have been
supplemented by a new statute which appears to impose civil
liability on physicians and mental health professionals who fail
to warn intended victims and the police of dangerous patients.
25 7
In 1986, the General Assembly adopted a statute requiring
"qualified mental health professionals" (including physicians) to
warn intended victims of dangerous patients.5 8 This statute was
in response to Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia,29 a California case which imposed on psychotherapists the
obligation to take reasonable steps to protect potential victims
from their dangerous patients. This duty is commonly referred
to as a "duty to warn" intended victims. 260 One of the arguments
against imposing this form of liability is that it breaches the
confidentiality of therapy and makes violent people less likely
to enter therapy.
26'
-1 KRS § 202A.400 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
2 q Id.
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
2 Id. The case has been the basis of a number of excellent articles. E.g., Roth &
Meisel, Dangerousness, Confidentiality, and the Duty to Warn, 134 Aiu. J. PsYcImATRY
508 (1977); Stone, The Tarasoff Decision: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society,
90 HAzy. L. REv. 358 (1976); Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists: A
Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. CoLO. L. REv. 283 (1977).
1 The arguments against imposing Tarasoff-type liability include the following:
the duty to warn is based on the ability of mental health professionals to predict
dangerousness, and such predictions cannot be made with any degree of confidence;
warning intended victims will require that the confidences of therapy be revealed, and
this breach of confidence will interfere with therapy among the very persons (the
potentially dangerous) whom society would like to have in therapy; the breach of the
confidences of therapy will interfere with the privacy of those in therapy; there are
substantial overpredictions of dangerousness, so many persons who are in fact not
dangerous will have their therapy interrupted by unnecessary warnings to victims; it is
unusual and unfair to require "rescue" of third parties; once patients who have aggres-
sive feelings understand that there is a duty to warn, they will not reveal these feelings
in therapy for fear of the disclosure and therefore over the long run the duty to warn
will largely be self-defeating by discouraging disclosure of aggression; even if some good
can be accomplished by a duty to warn, the costs to therapy exceed the potential benefits
of such disclosures. These arguments and other issues regarding Tarasoff are discussed
in S. SmrrH & R. MEYER, supra note 22, at Ch. 1.
Among the arguments in favor of imposing a Tarasoff-type duty to warn are the
following: the opportunity to avoid unnecessary death or serious injury; avoiding un-
necessary death or injury is so important that interference with therapy or the right of
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It is impossible to determine precisely what effect this duty
to warn has had on therapy, but there is some indication that
the impact is not overwhelming. It may have made therapists
more concerned about dangerous patients and made some pa-
tients more reluctant to discuss violence. 2 2 And although there
has been some increase in the breach of confidentiality to warn
potential victims, to a considerable degree, these warnings oc-
curred before Tarasoff.263
The tendency to emphasize the "duty to warn" aspect of
Tarasoff and to focus on the existence of a "known" victim264
is unfortunate. In many instances some other appropriate action
might allow greater protection for potential victims (the public)
while avoiding interferences with therapy confidences. Warnings
have the advantage of being easy to prove (either they were given
or they were not), but they are rarely flexible enough to provide
the protection the law should seek. The duty should be defined
more clearly to include actions other than warning. Therapists
around the country apparently already act as though Tarasoff
privacy is comparatively trivial; the duty imposed is not without precedent because
professionals are sometimes required to act in the interest of society rather than in the
interest of a client or patient (e.g., the duty to isolate or report some serious infectious
diseases); patients are not likely to refuse to disclose matters in therapy because of the
threat that the therapist will warn potential victims; although the prediction of danger-
ousness is not perfect, it is sufficiently accurate to be the basis of a warning when a
patient is apparently dangerous; if these predictions can be the basis for involuntary
commitment, they surely are accurate enough to provide the basis for a warning;
overpredictions of dangerousness resulting in some unnecessary warnings are a relatively
small price to pay to avoid murders and serious injury. See id. for a discussion of these
issues also.
Goodman, From Tarasoff to Hopper: The Evolution of the Therapist's Duty to
Protect Third Parties, 3 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 195 (1985); Note, Professional Obligation
and the Duty to Rescue: When Must a Psychiatrist Protect His Patient's Intended
Victims?, 91 YALE L.J. 1430 (1982).
6 Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff: Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 443; Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A
Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STA. L. Rv. 165
(1978). See Comment, Psychotherapists' Duty to Warn: Ten Years After Tarasoff, 15
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 271 (1985).
11 Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983). Although Tarasoff did
not speak solely in terms of the duty to warn, that has been the emphasis of many
commentators and the courts. See generally Crocker, Judicial Expansion of the Tarasoff
Doctrine: Doctor's Dilemma, 13 J. PSYCHATRY & L. 83 (1985); Merton, Confidentiality
and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers,
31 Em~oRY L.J. 263 (1982).
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applies to them, with many therapists identifying a "duty to
warn" as an ethical or moral duty as well as a legal duty. 265
One issue regarding Tarasoff, yet to be resolved, is the
question of how much information the therapist can give to
victims following the warning. It would not seem unusual for a
potential victim who is warned of danger to want more infor-
mation about the dangerous patient. It is probably safe to as-
sume that sufficient information may be given to allow potential
victims to protect themselves. Defining that level of information,
however, is extremely difficult.
Most state courts considering the question have adopted an
approach similar to California,2 66 although some have been re-
luctant to impose liability. 267 The California legislature, attempt-
ing to clarify the liability arising out of Tarasoff, adopted a
statute which provides a duty to warn only if the patient has
told the therapist of a "serious threat of violence against a
reasonably identifiable victim or victims. ' ' 268 The duty is dis-
charged by "reasonable effort to communicate that threat to the
victim ... and to a law enforcement agency.
' 269
Kentucky enacted a Tarasoff statute even though the Ken-
tucky courts had not yet adopted the Tarasoff duty.270 The
Kentucky statute is hardly a model of clarity. It was, curiously,
made a part of Chapter 202A, dealing with the Hospitalization
of the Mentally III (civil commitment). The statute requires that
a "qualified mental health professional" warn or "take reason-
able precautions to provide protection from violent behavior"
if there is 1) an actual threat of physical violence against a
reasonably identifiable victim or 2) the patient has communicated
" See Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, supra note 263.
E.g., Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982); McIntosh v.
Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Peck v. Counseling Serv. of
Addison County, 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985) (this case is particularly interesting because it
involved property damage rather than injury to persons).
-7 Furr v. Spring Grove Hosp., 454 A.2d 414 (Md. 1983). For a discussion of the
issues see Note, The Scope of a Psychiatrist's Duty to Third Persons: The Protective
Privilege Ends Where the Public Peril Begins, 59 NoTRE D.itE L. REv. 770 (1984).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.92 (West 1986) (emphasis added).
Id.
2" KRS § 202A.400 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
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an "actual threat of some specific violent act." 27' The statute
does not make it clear when the duty is one to warn and when
it is one to take other precautions (seek civil commitment).
The duty to warn an identifiable victim is discharged when
the professional takes reasonable efforts to "communicate the
threat to the victim, and to notify the police department closest
to the patient's and the victim's residence of the threat of
violence. 1'272 When there is threat of a specific violent act but
the victim is not identifiable, the duty to warn is met if "rea-
sonable efforts are made to communicate the threat to law
enforcement authorities. "273
In addition to the "duty to warn," the Kentucky statute
speaks in terms of a "duty to take reasonable precautions to
' Id.
(1) No monetary liability and no cause of action shall arise against
any qualified mental health professional for failing to predict, warn of or
take precautions to provide protection from a patient's violent behavior,
unless the patient has communicated to the qualified mental health profes-
sional an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or
reasonably identifiable victim, or unless the patient has communicated to
the qualified mental health professional an actual threat of some specific
violent act.
(2) The duty to warn of or to take reasonable precautions to provide
protection from violent behavior arises only under the limited circumstances
specified in subsection (1) of this section. The duty to warn a clearly or
reasonably identifiable victim shall be discharged by the qualified mental
health professional if reasonable efforts are made to communicate the
threat to the victim, and to notify the police department closest to the
patient's and the victim's residence of the threat of violence. When the
patient has communicated to the qualified mental health professional an
actual threat of some specific violent act and no particular victim is
identifiable, the duty to warn has been discharged if reasonable efforts are
made to communicate the threat to law enforcement authorities. The duty
to take reasonable precaution to provide protection from violent behavior
shall be satisfied if reasonable efforts are made to seek civil commitment
of the patient under this chapter.
(3) No monetary liability and no cause of action shall arise against
any qualified mental health professional for confidences disclosed to third
parties in an effort to discharge a duty arising under subsection (1) of this
section according to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.
"2 KRS § 202A.400(2). Some confusion undoubtedly will arise from the requirement
that the professional notify "the police department closest to the patient's and the
victim's residence. .. ." Id. (emphasis added). In some cases, of course, the same police
department will not be closest to both patient and victim.
27 Id.
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provide protection from violent behavior." 274 The duty to take
"reasonable precautions" is discharged by seeking civil commit-
ment under Chapter 202A.275 There is no indication when the
duty is to warn and when it is to take the reasonable precautions.
Conceivably, both duties could arise in a single case, as where
a patient is quite dangerous, has made threats against a specific
individual, and cannot be found. The failure to define more
clearly which duty arises when will create some hardship for
medical and psychological practitioners. It is not, however, the
only matter which is unclear in the statute.
The statute provides protection from liability for disclosing
confidences to third parties in an effort to discharge the duties
arising under the statute.276 However, the extent to which con-
fidences may be released after a warning has been given is not
clear. Because the degree to which a professional may answer
questions from the victim or authorities is not specified, presum-
ably the professional is permitted to release information as long
as the disclosure is "reasonable."
This statute potentially extends the breach of confidentiality
from medical care and psychotherapy in ways that are consid-
erably greater than those established by the Tarasoff decision.
The Kentucky statute requires, when there is a known victim,
that both the victim and the police be warned of the threat of
violence.277 The Kentucky statute also provides for a duty to
warn even when there is no specific victim identified; when a
specific violent act is threatened there is an obligation to inform
law enforcement authorities.
278
Furthermore, the statute speaks in terms of the obligations
of "qualified mental health professionals" to take these ac-
tions. 279 The civil commitment statute, to which the Tarasoff law
was attached, includes as "qualified mental health profession-
als": psychiatrists, t 0 psychologists at the doctoral or master's
274 Id.
2-Id.
V', KRS § 202A.400(3).
2. KRS § 202A.400(2). See supra note 272.
-' KRS § 202A.400(2).
, Id.
KRS § 202A.011(11)0b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982). A psychiatrist is defined
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level designated as competent to make examinations under Chap-
ter 202A,281 nurses with a master's degree in psychiatric nursing
and two years clinical experience s2 2 social workers licensed for
independent practice, 83 and physicians licensed to practice med-
icine or osteopathy (including medical officers of the United
States).24 Thus, the classes of professionals required to issue
warnings under the statute are very broad and include all phy-
sicians.
The scope of the statute is further confused by the definition of
the term "patient. ' 28 5 The Tarasoff statute describes duties that
arise when a "patient" makes a threat of violence. However,
the term "patient" is defined in Chapter 202A as someone who
is in a hospital as part of the civil commitment procedure .
2 6 If
this definition were literally followed, the Tarasoff statute would
be so narrow as to be nearly ineffective. Most likely, therefore,
the courts would interpret the context in which "patient" is used
to mean anyone in a professional relationship with a qualified
mental health professional, rather than to follow the definition
in Chapter 202A.28
7
In addition, the statute seems to require that a warning (or
other action) be taken upon the communication of "an actual
as a licensed M.D. or osteopath "who is certified or eligible to apply for certification
by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc." Id. Because the definition
of qualified mental health professional includes licensed physicians, specifically including
psychiatrists within the definition adds very little.
KRS § 202A.011(1)(c).
KRS § 202A.011(ll)(d). "A licensed registered nurse with a master's degree in
psychiatric nursing from an accredited institution and two (2) years of clinical experience
with mentally ill persons."
-3 KRS § 202A.011(ll)(e). "A certified social worker licensed for the independent
practice of clinical social work under the provisions of KRS chapter 335."
KRS § 202A.011(ll)(a).
:' KRS § 202A.400(l) (the Tarasoff statute) describes the duty as arising when
"the patient has communicated to the qualified mental health professional on actual
threat of physical violence ... against a reasonably identifiable victim, [or when] the
patient has communicated ... to the qualified mental health professional an actual
threat of some specific violent act." KRS § 202A.400(l) (emphasis added).
KRS § 202A.011(9). "Patient means a person under observation, care or treat-
ment in a hospital pursuant to the provisions of this chapter [202A]." Id.
2 The definitions section of KRS Chapter 202A invites a modification of its
definition when the context requires. KRS § 202A.011 defines terms used in 202A "unless
the context otherwise requires." KRS § 202A.011.
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threat of some specific violent act.' '218 The statute does not make
it clear that the professional must believe this threat. Therefore,
the statute could be read to require warnings or action every
time a specific violent act is communicated, whether or not it is
a believable threat. Because many specific threats are made that
are not likely to result in violence, this uncertainty may expand
considerably the number of times that a professional would be
required to give warnings.
The expansion of the obligation to report as defined in the
new Kentucky statute may present a significant threat to confi-
dentiality in medical treatment and psychotherapy. Predictions
of dangerousness are notoriously inaccurate with substantial over-
prediction of dangerousness.2 19 This suggests the possibility of
substantial interference with the confidences of treatment and
therapy. The significant uncertainties left by the new statute are
likely to confuse therapists and patients, to the extent they are
aware of, or understand, the new law.
E. Employers (Institutions) and Children
Confidentiality may be compromised .when medical treatment
or psychotherapy is conducted "for" an institution rather than
the patient or client. 290 In such a case, the person or institution
paying for the diagnosis or treatment may demand information
from the consultation. An example is the industrial psychologist
who consults with employees of a corporation. Suppose that
during therapy an employee discloses personal information that
KRS § 202A.400(1).
J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981) (at best only one prediction
in three of violence is correct); Kahle & Sales, Due Process and the Attitudes of
Professionals Toward Civil Commitment, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH
(Lipsitt & Sales eds. 1980); Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and
Psychiatric Testimony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP.
U.L. REV. 11 (1976); Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1084 (1976); Ennis
& Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Court-
room, 62 CAlnF. L. REv. 693 (1974). There is some reason to believe that the ability to
predict violence in the short-run may be improving somewhat. Monahan, The Prediction
of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AMs. J.
PSYCHIATRY 10 (1984).
:" For a review of access to medical records by someone other than the patient see
W. Roach, S. Chernoff & C. Esley, Medical Records and the Law 72-110 (1985).
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strongly suggests to the therapist that the person should not be
promoted to a higher management position. Is the therapist
obligated to report the information to the corporation or to
maintain the confidences of the employee? Similar questions may
arise from examinations conducted by school psychologists or
state mental facility therapists.
Strong arguments can be made both for the importance of
maintaining confidentiality and for the right of the therapist to
disclose information. The degree to which confidentiality should
be maintained may depend on the purpose of the consultation
and the expectations of the participants. 291 For example, if a
corporation wishes to provide counseling to help promote the
emotional welfare of employees, confidentiality should be en-
sured. If, however, the corporation wishes to assess the emo-
tional stability of its employees to determine job suitability,
confidentiality cannot be fully protected. Serious problems arise
when the purpose is unclear or in cases where there are a number
of incompatible purposes. An employee often does not fully
realize that there will be a breach of confidentiality if the insti-
tution seeks the information. And in some instances the em-
ployee unknowingly may have given a blanket consent to release
of information. Arguably, therefore, there is some obligation
for practitioners and therapists to ensure that patients have a
clear understanding about confidentiality before any information
is revealed in diagnosis or treatment.2 92
Two of the statutes discussed previously claim to protect
confidentiality rather than establish a privilege.2 93 As such, these
2 See Cooper, Minors Participation in Therapy Decisions: A Written Therapist-
Child Agreement, 1 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOTmRAPY 93 (1984); Kobocow,
McGuire & Blau, The Influence of Confidentiality Conditions on Self-Disclosure of
Early Adolescents, 14 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RsS. & PRAC. 435 (1983); Melton, supra note
175; Melton, Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values
in Public Policy, 38 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983) (adolescents are competent to make
decisions); Messenger & McQuire, The Child's Conception of Confidentiality in the
Therapeutic Relationship, 18 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 123 (1981). For
a broader review of children's mental health rights, see N. REPPUCCi, L. WEITHORN, E.
MULVEYS & J. MONAHAN, CHIDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND TH LAW (1984); Kaser-
Boyd, Adelman & Taylor, Minors Ability to Identify Risks and Benefits of Therapy, 16
PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: REs. & PRAC. 398 (1985).
11 In some cases the codes of ethics suggest this is appropriate, see supra notes 15-
18.
" KRS §§ 319.111, 335.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
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statutes might be the basis for a refusal to reveal information
without the consent of the patient. The social worker statute
provides that the social worker may not "disclose any infor-
mation ... acquired from persons consulting him in his psy-
chotherapeutic capacity.... ",294 Less clear is the psychologist-
patient privilege which provides that "the confidential relations
and communications between" psychologist and patients "are
placed upon the same basis as those provided by law between
attorney and client.... -9- Arguably this creates a legal obli-
gation of confidentiality similar to that of an attorney-client
relationship and limits the ability (without consent) of the psy-
chologist to release information to an institution. Unfortunately
for such an argument, however, the final part of the statute
implies that it was meant to provide for only a privilege and not
a general obligation of confidentiality. 296 In any case, both stat-
utes are subject to a number of exceptions which would permit
a considerable breach of confidentiality. 297
Children present similar problems because ordinarily parents
have the right to receive information concerning their minor
chldren, although this right has been modified by some states.
In some circumstances a minor may object to the release of
information to parents or others. The age of the child is un-
doubtedly a factor in determining whether information should
be released to parents; a five year-old presents different problems
than an adolescent. When parents are involved with the treatment,
a professional could establish a contract with the parents in
which the parents agree that they will not receive, or be able to
demand, information from the therapy. A more difficult ques-
tion arises when treatment is undertaken without a clear under-
standing about parental rights or without the consent of parents,
and the parents later demand information. If therapy proceeded
without an understanding with the minor concerning the release
KRS § 335.170 (emphasis added). This statute is quite limited in its application.
KRS § 319.111 (emphasis added).
The language quoted in the text seems to suggest that there is created a general
protection for communications and confidential relations. However, the next phrase of
the statute is, "and nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any such
privileged communication to be disclosed." Id. (emphasis added).
1'7 See supra notes 128-218 and accompanying text.
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of information, the professional justifiably would be reluctant
to release any information, and refuse to release the information
without a clear legal determination of the parents' right to have
it. Nevertheless, parents probably could claim a legal right to
access to much of the information.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act permits
parents to have access to their children's education records. 29
In some cases, these records may include medical or psycholog-
ical information, although usually these files do not contain a
great deal of medical or mental health information not already
known by the parents. In addition, Kentucky law specifically
permits minors to consent to some forms of treatment, yet
authorizes the release of information regarding such treatment
to parents when it would be in the best interest of the child.299
Outside of these narrow treatment areas parents probably have
substantial rights to information about their minor children. At
the same time, there has been movement toward permitting some
kinds of treatment without parental consent and without an
absolute right of parental access to information from treat-
ment.3
00
A strong argument can be made for the adoption of statutes
that protect the confidentiality of minors' treatment and therapy.
Older minors (adolescents) are competent to make treatment
decisions and, in fact, make decisions much like adults do.
301
20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1982).
KRS § 214.185 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) provides that minors may consent
to treatment for venereal disease, pregnancy (except abortion), alcohol or drug abuse,
contraception. (except sterilization), and child birth. KRS § 214.185(1). That statute also
provides that "[t]he professional may inform the parent ... of any treatment given or
needed where, in the judgment of the professional, informing the parent or guardian
would benefit the health of the minor patient." KRS § 214.185(5) (emphasis added).
There is an interesting conflict in the Kentucky statutes regarding consent to treat-
ment for drug and alcohol abuse. Compare KRS §§ 214.185(1) and 222.440 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1982) (permitting minors to give consent), with 222.260 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982
and Supp. 1986) (which requires the consent of the minor and the parent).
100 See generally Planned Parenthood of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 442 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Serv's., 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Note, Carey,
Kids and Contraceptives: Privacy's Problem Child, 32 U. MiA ,n L. REv. 750 (1978).
ml American Academy of Pediatrics, A Model Act Providing for Consent of Minors
to Health Services, 51 Pediatrics 293 (1973); Melton, Children's Participation in Treat-
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Protecting the confidentiality of minors is important, especially
when psychotherapy is involved. In any event, the limits on
confidentiality, if any, should be clearly understood before con-
fidences are revealed.
F. Third-Party Payment and Confidentiality
The increasing use of insurance, government-funded pro-
grams, and other third-party payments for treatment may threaten
confidentiality in several ways. Payers require some information
concerning the basis of, reason for, and extent of therapy. This
information often will include specifics about the mode of treat-
ment, the diagnosis and factual basis for diagnosis, and the
frequency of treatment. It may include additional information
about history and prognosis. This information may be shared
with other institutions and insurance companies and in some
instances also may be available to an employer who is paying
for the insurance. In addition, third-party payers increasingly
are establishing auditing and review systems that require the
release of information to review committees or commissions.
Hospitalization is particularly likely to cause this extensive re-
view. Finally, if the professional is accused of fraud for wrongful
billing, the criminal investigation may result in the subpoena of
a wide range of patient records to establish proof of fraud. 02
Because the release of information may be necessary to ob-
tain payment for services, professionals may have a conflict
between obtaining payment and protecting confidentiality. This
conflict has resulted in objections by mental health professionals
to peer review of therapy?0 3 The problems, however, extend
beyond peer review.
Long-term storage and transfer of information from therapy
poses additional threats to confidentiality. Rules regarding med-
ment Planning: Psychological and Legal Issues, 12 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: REs. & PRAc.
246 (1981); Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Test of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134
AM. J. PSYcHIATRY 279 (1977).
'2 See, e.g., In re Zungia, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983); In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983); Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 395
Mass. 284, 479 N.E.2d 674 (1985).
' See Theaman, The Impact of Peer Review on Professional Practice, 39 Abi.
PSYCHOLOGIST 406 (1984).
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ical information are not sufficient to protect the more sensitive
information regarding therapy.304 Information given to one third-
party payer may be transferred to other persons or used for
purposes other than payment for services. For example, infor-
mation given to an insurance company might be given to the
employer who is providing the insurance; the employer then
might use the information to make decisions about employment
status. Information released to third-party payers and related
investigators is one of the most important limits on confiden-
tiality because these releases are so common and the information
is so poorly protected from review by others.
G. Consent
In many of the exceptions to confidentiality noted in this
section, confidentiality is breached based on the consent of the
patient. Often, however, the consent is not fully voluntary in
the sense that the patient will suffer significant penalties for
failing to reveal the information. For example, insurance benefits
or employment may be denied to those who refuse access to the
information. This is at best a coerced consent to the release of
information which, as discussed, may carry with it a secondary
release of information to others. In other instances patients may
not realize that they are waiving certain confidentiality rights,
or recognize the full consequences of the waiver. The current
law provides very little legal protection against coerced consent
or secondary release and sharing of information.
H. Group Therapy
Because group psychotherapy involves a number of patients
in therapy together, information revealed in the group may not
remain confidential. Even where members of the group agree
not to reveal outside of the group any information disclosed in
the group sessions, there is little effective legal protection for
that information. Several legal theories might be used to impose
1' See Bent, Multidimensional Model for Control of Private Information, 13 PROF.
PsYcHOLOGY: REs. & PRAc. 27 (1982). The issue of the confidentiality of records has
presented special problems. See Sloan & Hall, Confidentiality of Psychotherapeutic
Records, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 435 (1984).
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liability on group members who breach confidentiality, including
a contract of nondisclosure or negligence based on the mutual
duty of nondisclosure. Such remedies, however, are speculative,
and the actual protection of information revealed in a group, as
a practical matter, is limited.
L Assistants, Teaching, and Research
The use of assistants in providing medical care and psycho-
therapy increases the number of persons with access to informa-
tion. Such assistants normally would be expected to have the
obligation to maintain the confidentiality of any information
they received. Therefore, the chance of a breach of confiden-
tiality associated with the release of information to them prob-
ably is not great.
Clinical training of students and others results in still further
dissemination of information about patients. Students also should
have a legally enforceable obligation of confidentiality.
Research also may extend the availability of patient infor-
mation to others, sometimes without patient consent. For ex-
ample, "chart studies," in which patient files are examined
without contacting or involving the patient, commonly are un-
dertaken without informed consent.30 5 Although the use of pa-
tients as research subjects or teaching subjects should increase
only modestly the risk of breaches of confidentiality, patients
should be free to decide whether or not they want to accept the
additional risk.306
J. When Will Confidentiality Apply?
The physician or psychotherapist comforting a nervous pa-
tient with the assurance of confidentiality, if completely truthful,
would have to hedge substantially the promise of confidentiality.
The professional could promise complete confidentiality as long
as the patient's condition did not become a matter of a court
case (when the professional would describe the limits on privi-
S" See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(5) (1986) (permitting chart studies without Institutional
Review Board approval).
" A good review of the issues of confidentiality, privacy, and research is Adams,
Medical Research and Personal Privacy, 30 ViL. L. REv. 1077 (1985).
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leges noted previously) and could tell the patient further: "I can
assure you of confidentiality unless you or others disclose in-
stances of child abuse or neglect or adult abuse or neglect, in
which case I would have to report that to the state. If you
describe activities that are dangerous to others I probably will
have to warn the victims and law enforcement authorities. The
discovery of some other dangerous conditions, such as certain
highly contagious diseases, may require that I report that to
local authorities. If you seek to receive payment from an insur-
ance company or other third-party payer, I will have to release
some information about treatment or therapy to that institution
and they possibly will share that information with others. Fur-
thermore, if I [the professional] am investigated for insurance
or Medicare or Medicaid billing problems or fraud, your records
may be reviewed by government investigators, prosecutors, grand
juries, and others. In the normal course of quality review, your
records may be seen by other professionals, although there is
every reason to hope that they will maintain the confidentiality
of the information in the records. If your employer is paying
for your health insurance, the employer may have access to your
records or at least those submitted for third-party reimburse-
ment.3 7 Should you enter group therapy, of course, other mem-
bers in the group may release the information disclosed in group.
A variety of assistants, students, and researchers also may have
access to your records, although they probably will not disclose
private information to very many other persons. If you are a
minor, your parents may demand access to the information
concerning your treatment or therapy; and if your employer is
providing the services, the employer may also have access to
information. Other than that, however, you can feel quite secure
that your confidences will be adequately protected."
This account regarding confidentiality, of course, is exagger-
ated somewhat. Nevertheless, it suggests the wide range of in-
-' If the employer is directly providing the care, treatment, or service (that is, if
the professional is also an employee of or direct contractor with the employer), then the
chance that the employer will have access to information from therapy or treatment is
increased. If that relationship exists, the patient would be given additional information.
There is a hint of this issue near the end of this discussion.
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vasions that are now possible in what are referred to as confiden-
tial relationships.
K. Why the Threat Now?
Several trends taken together have reduced the protection of
confidentiality for medical care and psychotherapy. Among the
most important of these has been the increased use of third-
party payers to cover the expenses of medical care and psycho-
therapy and the involvement of employers in providing health care
insurance. This has increased the information that must be trans-
ferred to third parties to ensure payment and has made more
medical and psychotherapy information available to employers.
This trend has been compounded by the ease and reduced cost
of storing, sorting, and transmitting data, which have resulted
in the ability to transfer and share information about medical
care and psychotherapy. The process of investigating legitimate
claims, as well as fraud, by third-party payers further requires
an invasion of confidential information. In addition, quality
assurance mechanisms involve some breach of confidentiality.
Another trend has been toward the adoption of common law or
statutory duties to breach confidentiality to protect third parties
from harm 03 In the aggregate, child abuse reporting, adult
abuse reporting, infectious disease reporting, and Tarasoff°9
obligations are developing an obligation to breach confidentiality
when a patient may in some way be dangerous to any other
person. In addition, the increasing reliance on medical and psy-
chological testimony results in greater demand for information
which previously might have remained confidential because no
one thought it was important or sought to rely on it.
Traditional legal concepts arguably are no longer adequate
to deal with the threats to confidentiality. If confidentiality is
important, new mechanisms of protection are required.
V. ARE CONFDENTIALIY AND PRiviLEoEs REALLY NECESSARY?
We commonly assume that confidentiality is important both
in medical care and psychotherapy, as reflected in codes of ethics
-:3 See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); KRS §
202A.400 (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU Supp. 1986).
-1" 551 P.2d 334.
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and broad statements of practitioners' duty of confidentiality.
Nevertheless, the law has sanctioned a broad range of exceptions
to it. In considering what protections the law should give to
confidentiality, a critical issue is the importance of confidential-
ity and how it compares with other important social interests.
A. Reasons for Protecting Confidentiality
The necessity of protecting confidentiality must be measured
in light of the goals of that protection: enhancing individual pri-
vacy, promoting successful treatment and therapy, and recogniz-
ing professional obligations of secrecy. Of these goals, the third
is the least important for both medical practitioners and psycho-
therapists. In fact, that goal may depend on the other two for
its legitimacy. 310 Patient or client welfare is the ultimate reason
for professional ethical obligations of secrecy.
In considering the degree to which confidentiality is neces-
sary, separation of medical care information from psychotherapy
information may be important. This distinction has been rec-
ognized by commentators' 3 1  and model rule drafters and the
Supreme Court,31 2 on the theory that the information from psy-
chotherapy is considerably more sensitive than information from
other medical treatment.
The privacy interests protected by confidentiality include in-
formation privacy and autonomy privacy. 3 3 Sensitivity of med-
ical information varies considerably in intensity. Some medical
information (e.g. the birth of a child or having been vaccinated
for rubella) ordinarily is not particularly sensitive and most
"I As noted earlier in this Article, as a practical matter, professional obligations
may play an important role in defining and pressing for protection of confidentiality.
This is particularly true in the development and enactment of privileges.
31 WiGmoRE, supra note 2, at § 2285, 2380a; Chafee, supra note 9, at 611; Degnan,
supra note 9, at 300; Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 CoLmn. L. REv. 388, 395
(1906). But see D. LouIsE & C. MUELLER, 2 Federal Evidence § 215, at 593-603 (1978);
Black, supra note 9, at 50-51.
312 Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 504 adopted a psychotherapist-patient
privilege, but rejected a physician-patient privilege.
3,1 Smith, supra note 72. See supra notes 74-121 and accompanying text. Autonomy
privacy relates to the decision to enter therapy or to be candid in therapy. The utilitarian
analysis described below, concerning confidentiality as a tool to promote effective care,
is closely related and autonomy privacy is considered there.
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people would not care who knows the information. Other infor-
mation (e.g. treatment for a venereal disease or drug abuse) is
of a type many people would consider sensitive because it could
be embarrassing or harmful if released to employers, friends, or
others.
As distinguished from medical treatment, the information
revealed in psychotherapy is among the most private imaginable.
That information deals not only with the most personal and
intimate details of life, but often with fantasies, fears, and
imaginations that are not revealed elsewhere. The very fact that
someone has entered therapy may be a matter of embarrassment
or potential harm if revealed to employers or others. Therefore,
the information revealed in psychotherapy is likely to be consid-
erably more sensitive than that disclosed as part of medical care
and, thus, the sense of privacy or the desire to protect that
information is likely to be greater.
Promotion of effective care is the additional reason to pro-
tect the confidentiality of medical care and psychotherapy. This
generally has been the basis for recognizing privileges, as re-
flected in the Wigmore criteria.314 The physician-patient privilege
has been poorly received in recent years because it is viewed as
unnecessary to promote medical care when those seeking medical
care have a strong interest in their own well being and the
information revealed is ordinarily not very sensitive. In most
instances, people will reveal the necessary information in the
interest of their own health. This may be contrasted with psy-
chotherapy where much more sensitive information is revealed
and where the necessity for therapy may be less apparent to the
patient. Furthermore, the absence of confidentiality may prevent
the level of trust, on which successful therapy often depends,
from developing between patient and therapist. This level of
trust is often less essential in the treatment of physical disorders.
B. The Importance of Confidentiality and Privileges
Several studies have been undertaken to consider the impor-
tance of confidentiality." 5 For the most part, these studies have
WrOMoRE, supra notes 2 and 5.
'J' R. Kahl, The Effects of Awareness of the Importance of Confidentiality and
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dealt with psychotherapy, placing an emphasis on the importance
of privileges to successful therapy.
Patients seem somewhat confused about the level of legal
protection afforded confidences of therapy. Some studies indi-
cate that there are some kinds of information patients would
reveal without legal protections for confidentiality.1 6 Other stud-
ies indicate that people believe that they generally would be less
open in therapy without the assurance of confidentiality. 317 A
study of inpatients indicates that they highly value confidentiality
but have a very limited understanding of the legal protections
of their rights. 318 Some patients may be reluctant to discuss
violent feelings if they know that the therapist has an obligation
to protect intended victims. 319 These studies may provide some
Lack of Privileged Communication Statutes for Group Psychotherapy (dissertation 1978);
Meyer & Smith, supra note 147; Miller & Thelen, Knowledge and Beliefs About Con-
fidentiality in Therapy, 17 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: REs. & PRAc. 15 (1986); Rosen, Why
Clients Relinquish Their Rights to Privacy Under Sign Away Pressure, 8 PROF. PsY-
CHOLOGY: R s. & PRAc. 17 (1977); Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical
Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. Rv. 893 (1982);
Simmons, Client Attitudes Toward Release of Confidential Information Without Con-
sent, 24 J. CLIMCAL PSYCHOLOGY 364 (1968); Weiner & Shuman, Privilege-A Compar-
ative Study, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 373 (1984); Note, Functional Overlap Between the
Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications
Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
316 Rosen, supra note 315; Shuman & Weiner, supra note 315 (a thorough exami-
nation of the attitudes of lay persons, patients, therapists, and judges); Simmons, supra
note 315; Weiner & Shuman, supra note 315 (finding little difference between a state
with a privilege and another without).
317 Meyer and Smith found that 81.8% of respondents to a questionnaire on
confidentiality indicated that they would refuse to enter group therapy or would be
substantially less inclined to be open in therapy without the assurance of confidentiality.
(The respondents were third-year university students.) Meyer & Smith, supra note 209,
at 639-40. Another survey revealed that a substantial number of people felt they would
be less open in therapy if they knew a psychotherapist was legally obligated to release
information from therapy. Note, supra note 315, at 1262. See generally Miller & Thelen,
supra note 315 (general population does not understand limits of confidentiality, but
patients would like to have this information when in therapy). But see R. Kahl, supra
note 315;- & studies cited supra note 316.
31 Schmid, Appelbaum, Roth & Lidz, Confidentiality in Psychiatry: A Study of
the Patient's View, 34 Hos. & ComUNrrY PsYcmATY 353 (1983). See Appelbaum,
Kapen, Walters, Lidz & Roth, Confidentiality: An Empirical Test of the Utilitarian
Perspective, 12 BuLr. Am. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY & L. 109 (1984).
31" A survey of therapists revealed that, within one year, about a fourth of them
had observed patients' reluctance to discuss violent tendencies when patients were in-
formed of the possibility of a breach of the confidences of therapy. Note, Where the
PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIALITY
indirect information about the importance of confidentiality and
privileges to therapy. They suggest that confidentiality plays a
role in, but is not critical to, successful therapy. However, they
do not measure directly the effects confidentiality actually has
on therapy.
320
The studies thus far are somewhat inconclusive and even
inconsistent regarding the importance of privileges to psycho-
therapy. Most patients, however, probably do not understand the
limits of confidentiality, even those limits relative to privileges.
Additional studies are needed to fully outline the importance of
confidentiality in psychotherapy and particularly to indentify the
kinds of information that require the most protection. For the
moment, most patients probably do not understand adequately
the limits of confidentiality, although confidentiality is important
to them and threats to confidentiality pose at least some barrier
to openness and trust in therapy relationships.
VI. PROVIDING MEANINGFUL PROTECTION
Like that of most states, Kentucky's protection of the con-
fidences of medical care and psychotherapy has been inconsistent
and confusing. This protection should be rationalized and clar-
ified. Only if the protection is relatively certain can the goals of
protecting privacy and promoting effective therapy and treat-
ment be accomplished at the lowest possible social cost.
321
Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff,
31 STAN. L. REv. 165, 183 (1978). See Beck, When the Patient Threatens Violence: An
Empirical Study of Clinical Practice After Tarasoff, 10 ButLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCEIATRY
& L. 189 (1982); Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, supra note 263. For a case study of using
the "duty to warn" to therapeutic advantage, see Wulsin, Bursztajn & Gutheil, Unex-
pected Clinical Features of the Tarasoff Decision: The Therapeutic Alliance and the
"Duty to Warn, " 140 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 601 (1983).
Willage and Meyer found that subjects were more open and candid in answering
personality inventories when confidentiality was assured than if they thought the results
of their survey might be released. Willage & Meyer, The Effects of Varying Levels of
Confidentiality on Sef-Disclosure, 2 GRouP 88 (1978).
'I' One effort to provide such information was inconclusive. See D. Willage, The
Effects of Informing Patients on the Limits of Confidentiality on Group Therapy, in 4
DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL 3595 (1981).
.2, It is important to recall that protecting confidentiality carries some social costs
because protected information is no longer available. This in turn may result in incorrect
or inefficient decision-making, greater costs associated with gathering some kinds of
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Unfortunately no single state can fully achieve these purposes
through state laws and procedures. As noted later in this section,
in some cases real protection of confidentiality requires a na-
tional approach. Nevertheless, a single state can do much to
rationalize its laws protecting confidentiality.
A. Medical Treatment
The confidences from medical treatment require different
protection than those of a more sensitive nature from psycho-
therapy. Although significant protection for the confidences of
psychotherapy is necessary, intense protection of medical infor-
mation probably is needed only in comparatively narrow areas
such as drug and alcohol abuse, matters related to sexual activ-
ities, and counseling that is in the nature of psychotherapy.
Under the current law there is broad protection of medical
information confidentiality, which may be broken when there is
even a modest societal interest in having the information. Con-
versations with medical practitioners suggest that the current
laws are widely misunderstood, in part because there is no single,
coherent statement of them.
The current physician-patient privilege statute, which is use-
less, should be replaced with a comprehensive statute defining
the obligation of confidentiality in medical care and detailing
the exceptions. These exceptions could generally track those
currently recognized. Communications in specially defined sen-
sitive subjects could be treated as information released in psy-
chotherapy. A limited number of very sensitive areas of medical
services, as noted above, 22 should be defined and provided
special protection.
B. Psychotherapy
Current laws regarding confidentiality and psychotherapy,
including testimonial privileges, are a hodgepodge of uncertainty
information, and reduced accountability (e.g., insurance payments for services). One
goal of the law should be to reduce social costs as much as possible while maintaining
an acceptable level of confidentiality.
122 Drug and alcohol abuse treatment, matters related to sexual activities, and
counseling in the form of psychotherapy were suggested as such areas.
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and exceptions. The following proposals could reduce unneces-
sary invasions of privacy while protecting the most critical social
interests in having information from therapy.
1. Confidentiality and privileges should be dealt with together
in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. This suggests a
single statute dealing with all psychotherapy privileges as a part
of the broader obligation of confidentiality.
323
2. There should be a single psychotherapist-patient privilege
as opposed to the variety of privilege statutes currently available
in Kentucky. The difficulty here is in defining which professions
should be included as "psychotherapists." The answer to this
question must be clear so that patients can easily understand
whether their communications to a professional will be covered.
The major problem is deciding which professionals should qual-
ify as psychotherapists. Psychotherapist should be defined as
narrowly as possible to avoid unnecessarily removing informa-
tion from courts. It is perhaps important to distinguish between
psychotherapy and counseling, the former often involving a more
probing and detailed analysis. 32 4 Counseling does involve some
sensitive and very confidential matters, yet those might be han-
dled in a manner similar to that proposed for medical care
(certain sensitive subjects would be protected from disclosure).
"' The current social worker privilege accomplishes this to some degree. KRS §
335.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). A very few jurisdictions have moved in this
direction, notably the District of Columbia and Illinois. The D.C. ordinance, passed in
1978, with a provision to limit disclosure of mental health patient information, was
challenged by the insurance industry, including Blue Cross and Blue Shield. The ordi-
nance limited the release of information to a brief statement of the fact of treatment,
length of treatment and diagnosis, and provided for independent professional review in
the case of dispute between an insurance company and mental health professional.
District of Columbia Mental Health Information Law, D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2001 (1981);
Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 91 1/2, 801 & ch. 110, 8-802 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). More recently,
Massachusetts has made a similar effort.
'4 For a good review of this issue, see Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 419 (1976),
which limited a psychotherapist-patient privilege to psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Counseling [as opposed to therapy] either does not, or should not, have as its aim a
deep penetration into the psychic processes of the patient or client. The need for a
privilege to foster the counselor-client relationship is, correspondingly, less readily ap-
parent." Id. The rules proposed by the Supreme Court (Rule 504(a)(2)) and other rules
have adopted a similar approach. See Note, The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial
Privilege: Defining the Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777 (1985).
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This analysis suggests that psychiatrists and psychologists i-
censed for independent practice should be covered by "strong"
confidentiality protections including a psychotherapist-patient
privilege. School counselors, social workers, psychiatric nurses,
psychologists not certified for independent practice, rape coun-
selors, and similar professionals should be considered counselors
with privilege status similar to physicians.
325
A related question about the existence of a privilege involves
the use of assistants and students in providing therapy. To
suggest a narrow privilege, professionals not directly qualified
for the privilege who are, in effect, in independent practice
should not be permitted to claim the privilege as an assistant of
a covered professional. Only when a person is in fact the patient
of the privilege-qualified professional or receiving services from
someone working under that person's direct supervision should
the strong confidentiality and privilege exist. Professionals (such
as physicians' assistants or nurses) seeing patients under a broad
or general protocol established by a professional should not be
included within the privilege as an assistant to the professional.
When these professionals are providing specific kinds of services
in very sensitive areas, however, then their patients should have
the special confidentiality and limited privilege suggested for
medical care.
Most privileges are tied to licensing statutes. A difficulty in
this area arises in psychiatry because no formal licensing is
31 This formulation has the difficulty of including within the protection of strong
confidentiality only the professions which tend to be the most expensive. This raises the
potential problem of discrimination based on economic ability to pay for services.
Arguments have been made for including social workers or some counselors within the
privilege. See e.g., Reynolds, Threats to Confidentiality, 21 J. NAT'L AM. Soc. WORKERS
108 (1976); Robinson, Testimonial Privilege and the School Guidance Counselor, 25
SYRACUsE L. REv. 911 (1974); Note, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CA.M
L. REv. 1050 (1973); Note, Testimonial Privileges and the Student-Counselor Relation-
ship in Secondary Schools, 56 IowA L. REv. 1323 (1971).
It has in fact been suggested that a privilege limited to psychologists and psychia-
trists is unconstitutional in that it violates the right of privacy and equal protection.
Comment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege. Are Some Patients More Privileged
Than Others?, 10 PAc. L.J. 801 (1979).
On the necessity for putting some limitations on all of these see generally Slovenko,
Commentaries on Psychiatry and Law: Shielding Communications With a Pet, 10 J.
PSYCHnATRY & L. 405 (1982); Note, supra note 324.
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required of psychiatrists. One possibility would be to permit the
Board of Medical Licensure to designate practitioners as psychi-
atrists for the purpose of the privilege statute thereby giving
patients some assurance of the privilege.
3. The patient/litigant exception to the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege should be limited both in the circumstances in
which it applies and in terms of the information which may be
sought under it.326 A strict test of the information's relevance
should be used in determining whether the information is subject
to the exception. 27 For example, a claim for pain and suffering
in a personal injury case should not give rise to the exception
unless there is a claim that the suffering is specifically relevant
to a special emotional condition. Even then, only information
directly relevant to the issue should be available to the adverse
party. Courts should be required to use in camera inspections
of material to determine relevance and to protect patients from
the unnecessary release of information to opposing parties. 328
4. The abuse and dangerousness exception to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege should be narrowed considerably. This
exception should apply only when the warning already has
311 See Note, The Case for a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege That Protects
Patient Identity, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1217.
31, The Massachusetts court held that fraud investigations that sought information
from psychotherapy should be limited to records that document the times and length of
patient appointments, fees, patient diagnoses, treatment plans and recommendations,
and somatic therapies [such as provision of medication or electroconvulsive [shock]
therapies]. Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 479 N.E.2d 674, 681 (1985). The court said the
records that "reflect patients' thoughts, feelings, and impressions, or contain the sub-
stance of the psychotherapeutic dialogue ... need not be produced." Id.
The Massachusetts court probably provided for excessive disclosure when it per-
mitted the routine release of diagnoses, treatment plans, and somatic treatments. These
may include extremely private information which may not significantly promote a fraud
investigation.
123 Judge Hufstedler has proposed meaningful limits on the use of the patient/
litigant exception. She sought to identify precisely the competing interests of the state
and the patient/litigant and to balance these interests in a manner that would maximize
protection of the patient's privacy. A party invoking the patient/litigant exception in
civil litigation, she proposed, in general should be limited to ascertaining the time,
length, cost, and ultimate diagnosis of the treatment. Under the exception, an adverse
party should be permitted to demand additional information concerning treatment and
related confidential communications only if that party demonstrates a compelling need
for this evidence. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (Hufstedier, J., concurring and dissenting).
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breached significantly the confidentiality of therapy, thereby
destroying the secrecy of the information. (These issues are
discussed following.)
5. Most other exceptions to the psychotherapy-patient privi-
lege should be eliminated as unnecessary or because they do
more harm than good. A narrow criminal defense exception
which permits in camera inspection of information to determine
relevance and importance would be appropriate. Examinations
conducted pursuant to court order or with an eye toward liti-
gation should not be included within the privilege because there
is no expectation of confidentiality. However, before the con-
sultation with the therapist the patient should be informed of
the absence of confidentiality.
6. Revealing information to certain third parties, if done
with the expectation of continued privacy, should not destroy a
privilege. The concept of extended confidentiality described be-
low would permit such a doctrine to exist. Group therapy, for
example, clearly should be within a privilege where the other
members of the group have a duty to maintain the confidences
of the group. The release of information to an insurance com-
pany or other third-party payer should not destroy any part of
the privilege when the third party has an obligation to maintain
the revealed confidences. Third-party disclosures that in fact
destroy the confidentiality of a communication, however, should
continue to destroy the privilege.
7. The federal approach to psychotherapy privileges should
be modified to provide for a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Most states recognize such a privilege in some form. Without
federal recognition of a privilege, however, federal law will
interfere with the state policy of protecting the confidences of
therapy and encouraging openness and honesty in psychother-
apy. Ironically, the Federal Rules of Evidence, which appear to
promote state policy in diversity cases, actually may be frustrat-
ing the purpose of state law by making the application of priv-
ileges inconsistent in federal cases.
Of even greater importance than modifying the rules regard-
ing privileges, however, is extending the duty of confidentiality
as part of a integrated protection of confidentiality. The follow-
ing would help ensure that psychotherapy confidentiality is pro-
tected meaningfully.
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8. The concept of "extended confidentiality" should be rec-
ognized. When information from psychotherapy is released to
others, it should be with a duty for the recipient to maintain the
confidentiality of the information in the same way that the
pyschotherapist had a duty to protect it. For example, infor-
mation given to third-party payers should carry with it a duty
to maintain the privacy of that information. Recipients would
not be permitted to transfer or share the information with others.
Group therapy members, if they have so agreed, should be
legally obligated to maintain the confidences of other members
of the group. A breach of these duties should give rise to civil
liability the same as if a therapist breached the duty of confi-
dentiality.
9. To make the extended obligation of confidentiality mean-
ingful, patients should not be required to waive it. For example,
insurance carriers, as a condition of insurance or payment for
services, should not be permitted to require that a patient waive
the carrier's obligation of confidentiality. Any information gath-
ered in the course of an insurance or Medicare fraud investiga-
tion should carry with it this form of extended or secondary
confidentiality also.
Although a state, through insurance regulation, at least par-
tially could implement such a system, it would be accomplished
much more effectively and efficiently if the interstate aspects of
it were controlled by federal law requiring that third-party payers
maintain confidentiality. As a practical matter, in the future this
may be among the most important assurances of confidentiality.
The information available to insurers and others would be re-
duced somewhat, but these losses would be modest compared
with the significant potential for advancing the protections of
confidentiality in psychotherapy.
10. The obligation to report child and adult abuse and to
warn potential victims of dangerous patients should be nar-
rowed. The Kentucky statutes in these three areas are vague and
overly broad. Abuse reporting should not be required when an
abuser is seeking treatment to stop the abuse and no immediate
threat to a child or adult is present. The duty to warn of
dangerous patients should be narrowed to require a warning to
the intended victim or law enforcement authorities, or the com-
mencement of civil commitment proceedings, and should be
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required only when the therapist believes a patient's threat rep-
resents a significant danger to the patient or others.
11. Confidentiality should apply to minors (including stu-
dents) and to those receiving psychotherapy as part of an insti-
tutional arrangement. Minors may consent to certain forms of
psychotherapy without parental consent and the confidences they
reveal in such therapy should be protected. That is, the infor-
mation should not be provided to parents unless the information
otherwise fell within one of the exceptions to confidentiality.
Similar protections should apply to employees and others who
obtain therapy as part of an institutional arrangement. Only if
it is clear throughout therapy that information will be provided
to an employer should that information be available. 329 As with
insurance claims, employers should not be permitted to release
information after therapy as condition of the patient's continued
employment or to demand or request a waiver of this obligation
of confidentiality.
12. A most difficult question is whether the patient should
be informed of the limits of confidentiality during therapy. If
confidentiality is to be breached other than in ways required by
law, then the patient should be informed of this. This may be
as important as the informed consent required for other proce-
dures. Therefore, when the therapist knows that a breach of
confidentiality will or is likely to occur, but is not required by
law, the therapist should have an informed consent obligation
to tell the patient. A strong argument also can be made for
requiring provision of information to patients regarding the cir-
cumstances in which the law requires that a therapist reveal
confidential information.
CONCLUSION
The promise of medical and psychotherapy confidentiality
suggested by the Kentucky statutes, as well as by the statutes of
many other states, is a "misguided hope. ' 330 In reality, uncer-
' The "throughout therapy" requirement might be met if the employee were
reminded at the beginning of each session of therapy that confidentiality would not be
protected.
33 Slovenko, supra note 197.
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tainty and limitations surround the privileges. More importantly,
a variety of factors has had the practical effect of reducing the
confidentiality protection. Examples of these factors are the
increased use of third-party payers, the availability of inexpen-
sive electronic storage and transmission of data, and increased
dependence on medical and psychological evidence in court. This
presents a problem in medical care, in psychotherapy it is a
much more critical issue.
The solution to this problem is to restructure statutes dealing
with confidentiality and to include privilege protections as part
of the overall protection of confidentiality. In psychotherapy
this should include a narrow, but strong, privilege with very
limited exceptions. It should also include a strong duty of con-
fidentiality ("extended confidentiality") not only for therapists
who receive information but also for those who receive confi-
dential information from therapists. That notably includes in-
surance companies and other third-party payers.
The promise to protect intensely personal medical care and
psychotherapy information need not be misguided or unrealized.
Careful drafting of a comprehensive, coherent, and consistent
statute could go a long way toward realizing the hope of con-
fidentiality.
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